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The Independent Counsel Statute:  
A Premature Demise 
Julian A. Cook, III* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I think a lot of people are questioning the concept of whether 
or not . . . we can set up someone who really is totally inde-
pendent. There’s really nobody who has total independence in 
our system of government, and if they had total independ-
ence, they would probably be dangerous, so we’re struggling 
now to see whether or not, putting this statute aside in all 
probability, there is a way that we can achieve a certain 
measure of independence, but more accountability. That’s 
what’s been lacking over the last 20 years.—Senator Fred 
Thompson1 
With the backdrop of the impeachment trial of President 
William Jefferson Clinton,2 Congress was confronted with the 
quandary of whether to reauthorize the independent counsel 
statute. As the statute approached its June 30, 1999 lapse date, 
lawmakers grappled with and bandied about an array of pro-
posals, including statutory abandonment,3 in the midst of tre-
 
 * Julian A. Cook, III, Assistant Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of 
Law, Texas Southern University. A.B. Duke University (1983), M.P.A. Columbia Uni-
versity (1985), J.D. University of Virginia (1988). I am very grateful to Professor Earl 
C. Dudley, who reviewed an earlier draft of this article and provided helpful sugges-
tions. I also thank Irrekka Clark for her research assistance. Finally, I thank my wife, 
Robin, for editing this article. The opinions expressed are those of the author. 
 1. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1999) (responding to ques-
tion posed by Tim Russert with respect to the possibility that the independent counsel 
statute would be reauthorized). 
 2. See ‘This Must Be a Time of . . . Renewal,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999, at A33 
(noting that on February 12, 1999, President Clinton was acquitted in his impeach-
ment trial); David Broder, Don’t Rewrite Independent-Counsel Statute, DENVER POST, 
Mar. 3, 1999, at B09; John Whitesides, Reno: Dump Independent Counsel Law, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 18, 1999, at A12. 
 3. See Jerry Seper, Counsel Statute Hearings on Tap Starr, Judges Who Chose 
Him to Testify, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1999, at A4; John Hanchette, Law Expiring That 
Allowed Counsel, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 30, 1999, at A03. For additional discus-
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mendous political tension and public fervor over the actions of 
the President, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, and mem-
bers of Congress.4 Ultimately, Congress allowed the statute to 
expire, leaving the prosecution of high-ranking Executive 
Branch officials in the hands of the Department of Justice.5 
Advocates of reauthorization could only hope that the issue of 
reauthorization would be revisited at a later time.6 
As noted by Senator Thompson, a persistent shortcoming 
associated with the statute “over the last 20 years” had been 
the failure to effect a statutory balance which preserved prose-
cutorial independence and latitude, yet provided sufficient 
safeguards against the runaway exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. Indeed, this objective underlied the statute’s enact-
ment. With Watergate serving as the precipitous event, and af-
ter five years of legislative effort, the original version of the 
statute emerged in 1978.7 Perceived as a mechanism that 
would bolster public confidence with respect to the prosecution 
of high-ranking members of the Executive Branch, the statute 
removed the prosecutive function from the Justice Department 
and placed it in the hands of a judicially appointed independent 
counsel.8 However, despite repeated attempts at modification, 
many believed that the want of adequate safeguards with re-
spect to independent counsel activity, inter alia, ultimately un-
dercut the very purpose of the legislation.9 
In this article, I dispute the contention that the statute’s 
arguable failures with respect to independent counsel account-
ability mandate statutory abandonment. By allowing the stat-
ute to lapse, Congress has necessarily subjected the public to 
the observance of a prosecutorial process strewn with conflicts 
of interest, as well as individual defendants to investigations 
 
sion of the proposals for statutory reform and the call for statutory abandonment, see 
infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text. 
 4. See Eileen McNamara, Local Politics, Local Cares, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 
1999, at B1; Katy Harriger, Fuming Over a Flawed Statute, Congress Decides Whether 
to Fix or Finish Off the Independent Counsel, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCE, Nov. 1, 
1998, at E1. 
 5. See Independent Counsels Needed: Abuses Shouldn’t Overshadow the Law’s 
Benefits, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., June 30, 1999, at 10A. 
 6. See John Hanchette, Independent-Counsel Concept May Not Be Dead, DES 
MOINES REG., June 30, 1999, at 5. 
 7. See Harriger, supra note 4, at E1. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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and prosecutions pursued by interested prosecutors. Instead, 
through statutory modification, the coveted balance between 
independent counsel liberty and accountability can be effec-
tively achieved. 
I will demonstrate how, through a proposal I initially pre-
sented in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, this 
balance can be achieved and the statute salvaged.10 To this end, 
I commence with a historical retracing of the statute, from its 
inception in 1978 through its last reauthorization in 1994. 
Thereafter, I will discuss and critique the leading argument 
presented in opposition to statutory renewal during the con-
gressional reauthorization hearings in 1999. Finally, I will re-
introduce my proposal for statutory reform and proceed to cri-
tique it in light of Morrison v. Olson,11 the United States 
Supreme Court case which upheld the statute’s constitutional-
ity. Through a detailed dissection of the opinion, I will demon-
strate not only the proposal’s constitutionality, but also how 
the proposal effectively regulates independent counsel activity, 
preserves independent counsel liberty, and ensures appear-
ances of propriety. 
II. HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE 
A. 1978 Special Prosecutor Law 
Enacted as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,12 
the original special prosecutor law13 subjected the following Ex-
ecutive Branch officials to its jurisdiction: the President; Vice 
President; officials listed in § 5312 of title 5;14 individuals em-
ployed in the Executive Office of the President or the Depart-
ment of Justice who were compensated at certain minimum 
 
 10. See Julian A. Cook, III, Mend It or End It? What to Do with the Independent 
Counsel Statute, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 320-37 (1998). 
 11. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 12. See Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978). 
 13. See 28 U.S.C. § 598 (1978) (setting five-year sunset provision for statute). 
 14. The following officials listed in § 5312 were thus subject to the special prose-
cutor law: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney 
General, Secretary of Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secre-
tary of Labor, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations, Secretary of Energy, and Secretary of Education. See 5 U.S.C. § 5312 
(1976) (amended 1977). 
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levels; any Assistant Attorney General; the Director and Dep-
uty Director of Central Intelligence; the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Commissioner; any of the aforementioned individuals who 
held such positions “during the incumbency of the President or 
during the period the last preceding President held office, if 
such President was of the same political party as the incum-
bent President”; and officers of the President’s principal na-
tional election or reelection campaign committee.15 
However, as a prerequisite to prosecution, a procedural 
mechanism involving the Attorney General and a panel of 
judges had to be followed. If the Attorney General received spe-
cific information indicating that an official delineated in sub-
section (b) had “committed a violation of any Federal criminal 
law” (excluding petty offenses), she was required to conduct a 
preliminary investigation.16 If, at the conclusion of the prelimi-
nary investigation, she determined “that the matter [was] so 
unsubstantiated that no further investigation or prosecution” 
was necessary, the Attorney General was required to inform 
the “division of the court”17 of her decision.18 This decision was 
 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1978) expressly provided: 
(b) The persons referred to in subsection (a) of this section are— 
  (1) the President and Vice President; 
  (2) any individual serving in a position listed in section 5312 of title 5; 
  (3) any individual working in the Executive Office of the President and com-
pensated at a rate not less than the annual rate of basic pay provided for level IV 
of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5; 
  (4) any individual working in the Department of Justice and compensated at 
a rate not less than the annual rate of basic pay provided for level III of the Execu-
tive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, any Assistant Attorney General, the 
Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 
  (5) any individual who held any office or position described in any of para-
graphs (1) through (4) of this subsection during the incumbency of the President or 
during the period the last preceding President held office, if such preceding Presi-
dent was of the same political party as the incumbent President; and 
  (6) any officer of the principal national campaign committee seeking the elec-
tion or reelection of the President. 
Id. 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) provided: 
The Attorney General shall conduct an investigation pursuant to the provisions of 
this chapter whenever the Attorney General receives specific information that any 
of the persons described in subsection (b) of this section has committed a violation 
of any Federal criminal law other than a violation constituting a petty offense. 
Id. § 591(a). The preliminary investigation could not exceed ninety days. See id. § 
592(b). 
 17. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1). The division of the court was not empowered to appoint 
COOK-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:26 AM 
1367] THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE 1371 
not subject to judicial review.19 In the event, however, the At-
torney General believed that further investigation or prosecu-
tion was warranted, she was required to request the appoint-
ment by the division of the court of a special prosecutor.20 In 
making the application, it was incumbent upon the Attorney 
General to include sufficient information to enable the court to 
adequately define the scope of the special prosecutor’s jurisdic-
tion.21 This jurisdictional grant was not necessarily fixed. It 
could be supplemented through the referral of what the statute 
termed “a matter that relates” to the earlier grant.22 Either the 
Attorney General or the special prosecutor were authorized to 
seek the expansion of jurisdiction on this basis.23 In the event a 
related matter was referred by the Attorney General, the spe-
cial prosecutor was required to notify the division of the court.24 
Notably, a majority of either the majority or minority party 
members of the Committee on the Judiciary of either the House 
of Representatives or the Senate could request, in writing, that 
the Attorney General seek the appointment of a special prose-
cutor.25 If such a request was submitted, the Attorney General 
had to provide a written response to the requesting congres-
sional committee detailing the actions, if any, undertaken by 
the Attorney General in response to the request.26 If an appli-
 
a special prosecutor in the event the Attorney General declined to seek such appoint-
ment. Id.; see also discussion of the division of the court infra notes 19-24, 29-31, 36-37, 
40-45, 73-74, and 88 and accompanying text. If, after her formal declination, the Attor-
ney General received additional information sufficient to justify additional investiga-
tion or prosecution, the Attorney General was required to seek the appointment by the 
court of a special prosecutor within 90 days of the receipt of the information. See 28 
U.S.C. § 592(c)(2). 
 19. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(f). 
 20. See id. § 592(c)(1). Similarly, the statute mandated that the Attorney General 
“apply to the division of the court for the appointment of a special prosecutor” if she 
failed to make a determination within the allotted 90 days. Id. 
 21. See id. § 592(d)(1). 
 22. See id. § 592(e). 
 23. See id. (providing that the Attorney General may ask the special prosecutor 
to accept the referral of related matters); see also id. § 594(e) (providing that a special 
prosecutor may seek the referral of related matters from either the Attorney General or 
the division of the court). 
 24. See id. § 594(e). 
 25. See id. § 595(e). 
 26. See id. The Attorney General had to respond no “later than thirty days after 
the receipt of such a request, or not later than fifteen days after the completion of a 
preliminary investigation of the matter with respect to which the request is made, 
whichever is later.” Id. 
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cation was not submitted, the Attorney General was required 
to explain the inaction.27 Public disclosure of the Attorney Gen-
eral’s written notification was generally prohibited, except to 
the extent the committee “on its own initiative or upon the re-
quest of the Attorney General” believed that release of portions 
of the notification would not adversely impact the rights of any 
individual.28 
The division of the court, which was part of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, consisted 
of three circuit court judges or justices who were appointed by 
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and 
served two-year terms.29 As has been noted, upon Attorney 
General application, the division of the court was required to 
appoint a special prosecutor, to define his prosecutorial juris-
diction,30 and, upon request of the Attorney General, to expand 
such jurisdiction.31 
During his incumbency, the special prosecutor could avail 
himself of all the investigative and prosecutorial methods tra-
ditionally employed by the Department of Justice, including 
utilizing the grand jury, engaging in civil, criminal, and appel-
late litigation, challenging claims of privilege, and applying for 
grants of immunity.32 In carrying out these duties, the special 
prosecutor could access Department of Justice resources, in-
cluding, but not limited to, pertinent records, files, and other 
materials, as well as departmental personnel.33 The statute 
also attempted to mandate compliance with the policies of the 
Justice Department; however, a proviso trailing the mandatory 
language arguably undermined this congressional intent. Spe-
cifically, compliance with departmental policies was required, 
but only “to the extent that such special prosecutor deem[ed] 
appropriate.”34 
In addition, there was an optional, rather indeterminately-
phrased reporting requirement that left much discretion to the 
 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. § 49(a), (d). Senior and retired judges or justices received priority in 
selection, and service was restricted to only one judge or justice from a particular court. 
See id. § 49(c), (d). 
 30. See id. § 593(b). 
 31. See id. § 593(c). 
 32. See id. § 594(a). 
 33. See id. § 594(d). 
 34. Id. § 594(f). 
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special prosecutor with respect to the report’s contents. Section 
595(a) provided, “A special prosecutor appointed under this 
chapter may make public from time to time, and shall send to 
the Congress statements or reports on the activities of such spe-
cial prosecutor. These statements and reports shall contain 
such information as such special prosecutor deems appropri-
ate.”35 
Further, prior to the cessation of operations, the special 
prosecutor was required to submit a final report to the division 
of the court, detailing “a description of the work of the special 
prosecutor, including the disposition of all cases brought, and 
the reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecu-
torial jurisdiction of such special prosecutor which was not 
prosecuted.”36 Discretion was retained by the division of the 
court with respect to the public release of the special prosecu-
tor’s reports. Release orders were to give due consideration to 
the rights of individuals mentioned in the report as well as any 
pending prosecutions.37 The special prosecutor was also re-
quired to inform the House of Representatives “of any substan-
tial and credible information which such special prosecutor re-
ceives that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.”38 
Once appointed, the special prosecutor was largely insu-
lated from removal. Unless impeached or convicted, the special 
prosecutor could only be removed by the Attorney General “for 
extraordinary impropriety, physical disability, mental incapac-
ity, or any other condition that substantially impair[ed] the 
performance of such special prosecutor’s duties.”39 If removed, 
the division of the court as well as the House and Senate Judi-
ciary Committees were to be provided with a report prepared 
by the Attorney General detailing the facts and reasons under-
lying the removal.40 Public disclosure of the report by either 
congressional committee or the division of the court was per-
mitted so long as neither the rights of individuals named in the 
report nor any pending prosecutions were prejudiced.41 A spe-
cial prosecutor was entitled to contest his removal in a civil ac-
 
 35. Id. § 595(a) (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. § 595(b)(2). 
 37. See id. § 595(b)(3). 
 38. Id. § 595(c). 
 39. Id. § 596(a)(1). 
 40. See id. § 596(a)(2). 
 41. See id. 
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tion brought before the division of the court.42 
A special prosecutor seeking to conclude his investigation, 
could do so upon notifying the Attorney General that all mat-
ters within his prosecutorial jurisdiction had “been completed 
or so substantially completed that it would [be] appropriate for 
the Department of Justice to complete such investigations and 
prosecutions,” and by submitting a final report to the division 
of the court.43 Alternatively, a special prosecutor’s operations 
could be terminated by the body that appointed him—the divi-
sion of the court. Subsection (b)(2)44 provided, in pertinent part: 
The division of the court, either on its own motion or upon 
suggestion of the Attorney General, may terminate an office 
of special prosecutor at any time, on the ground that the in-
vestigation of all matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction 
of the special prosecutor or accepted by such special prosecu-
tor under section 594(e) of this title, and any resulting prose-
cutions, have been completed or so substantially completed 
that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to 
complete such investigations and prosecutions.45 
B. 1983 Amendments 
In 1983, an array of amendments was effected which was 
designed to remedy deficiencies that were both structural and 
perceptive.46 Present day usage of the term “independent coun-
sel” stemmed from these amendments, which substituted the 
term throughout the statute in lieu of “special prosecutor.”47 
The change, which was purely symbolic, was intended to re-
move the “Watergate stigma” that was associated with the 
term “special prosecutor.”48 
In addition, the 1983 amendments constricted the number 
of covered officials. Whereas in 1978 any officer of the principal 
 
 42. See id. § 596(a)(3). 
 43. Id. § 596(b)(1)(A). 
 44. See id. § 596(b)(2). 
 45. Id.; see also discussion of Morrison v. Olson regarding the constitutionality of 
this provision, as well as its application to a statutory proposal advocated by the au-
thor, infra notes 130-48, 229-34 and accompanying text. 
 46. See 28 U.S.C. § 598 (1982) (amended 1983) (setting five-year sunset provi-
sion). 
 47. See id. §§ 591-98, § 49. 
 48. See KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL 
PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1992). 
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national campaign committee was subject to the independent 
counsel law, the 1983 amendments confined the statute’s appli-
cability to higher level officials; namely, the chairman and 
treasurer of the principal committee, as well as “any officer of 
the campaign exercising authority at the national level, such as 
the campaign manager or director, during the incumbency of 
the President.”49 In a related adjustment,50 the statute was fur-
ther amended to permit the appointment of an independent 
counsel to investigate individuals not delineated in § 591(b). 
Section 591(c) now authorized the appointment of an independ-
ent counsel whenever the Attorney General or other Depart-
ment of Justice officer could not properly investigate allega-
tions of criminal wrongdoing on account of a personal, 
financial, or political conflict of interest.51 
Section 592 was also subject to some notable revisions. 
First, the discretion of the Attorney General was augmented 
with respect to the preliminary investigation. While the Attor-
ney General retained the authority to evaluate the specificity of 
a criminal allegation, she was further empowered to assess the 
credibility of the source of the information.52 Thus, the Attorney 
 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(8). 
 50. See id. Section 591(b)(3)-(7) was also amended to read, in pertinent part: 
(3) any individual working in the Executive Office of the President who is compen-
sated at or above a rate equivalent to level II of the Executive Schedule under sec-
tion 5313 of title 5; 
(4) any Assistant Attorney General and any individual working in the Department 
of Justice compensated at a rate at or above level III of the Executive Schedule 
under section 5314 of title 5; 
(5) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 
(6) any individual who held any office or position described in any of paragraphs 
(1) through (5) of this subsection during the period consisting of the incumbency of 
the President such individual serves plus one year after such incumbency, but in 
no event longer than two years after the individual leaves office; 
(7) any individual described in paragraph (6) who continues to hold office for not 
more than 90 days into the term of the next President during the period such indi-
vidual serves plus one year after such individual leaves office. 
Id. § 591(b)(3)-(7).  
 51. See id. § 591(c). 
 52. See id. § 592(a)(1). Author Terry Eastland noted the reason underlying this 
amendment: 
The “specific information” standard affected not just the [Hamilton] Jordan case. 
In his testimony, Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani characterized as a 
“persistent problem” the “deliberate aim of the drafters to remove any assessment 
of credibility from the triggering process.” It was the experience of the Depart-
ment, said Giuliani, that a sufficiently specific allegation could trigger the law 
even when it came from a source that was “inherently incredible” and even when 
COOK-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:26 AM 
1376 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
General was now authorized to decline further investigation on 
the basis of a source’s want of credibility.53 On the other hand, 
the 1983 amendments definitively restricted the expanse of an 
Attorney General’s preliminary investigative authority. Section 
592(a)(2) explicitly prohibited the Attorney General from con-
vening grand juries, negotiating plea bargains, granting im-
munity, or issuing subpoenas.54 
The amendments also eased the Attorney General’s capac-
ity to decline the referral of matters for independent counsel 
prosecution. There was concern that the original standard, 
which sanctioned the failure to appoint an independent counsel 
only when a “matter [was] so unsubstantiated that no further 
investigation or prosecution [was] warranted,” too easily trig-
gered independent counsel investigations.55 Accordingly, § 592 
(b)(1) was changed, permitting declination when the Attorney 
General determined “that there [were] no reasonable grounds 
to believe that further investigation or prosecution [was] war-
ranted.”56 In making this determination, the Attorney General 
 
the charge itself was “indisputably incredible.” 
  Congress judged the standard “too low” and decided to raise it by enabling 
the Attorney General also to consider the credibility of the accuser. The concern for 
fairness was evident. 
TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS, AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 71 (1989). 
 53. Subsection (f) was added to § 593, permitting the division of the court to ex-
tend up to 60 days the period to conduct a preliminary investigation, upon a showing of 
good cause by the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(f). 
 54. See id. § 592(a)(2). 
 55. Eastland made these observations in regard to this amendment: 
  While the Jordan case exposed a problem faced by the Attorney General in 
evaluating whether a preliminary investigation should even be opened, the Jordan 
and [Timothy] Kraft cases both illustrated a difficulty the Attorney General had in 
making the later decision of whether to apply for a special prosecutor. In those 
cases the Attorney General was forced to seek a special prosecutor because, as re-
quired by Title VI, he was unable to tell the court, at the close of the respective 
preliminary investigations, that “the matter is so unsubstantiated that no further 
investigation or prosecution is warranted.” This standard prevented the Attorney 
General from exercising the kind of routine discretion available to all other prose-
cutors. 
  . . . Former Special Prosecutor Arthur Christy, who handled the Jordan case, 
told the Senate that the standard for referral was “too quick a trigger”. . . . So it 
was that a second standard stated in Title VI was deemed too low. And unfair. 
EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 72-73. 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1). See also the changes to § 592(c)(1) (substituting “finds 
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted,” 
in lieu of “that the matter is so unsubstantiated as not to warrant further investigation 
or prosecution”) and the changes to § 592(c)(2) (substituting “reasonable grounds exist 
to warrant” in lieu of “such information warrants”). 
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was required to comply with policies promulgated by “the De-
partment of Justice with respect to the enforcement of criminal 
laws.”57 
The congressional will to better integrate independent 
counsel activity with departmental policies was evidenced in an 
array of revisions to § 594. An independent counsel was now 
permitted “to dismiss matters within his prosecutorial jurisdic-
tion without conducting an investigation or at any subsequent 
time prior to prosecution if to do so would be consistent with the 
written or other established policies of the Department of Jus-
tice.”58 Similarly, subsection (f) was amended to require inde-
pendent counsel compliance with Department of Justice poli-
cies “except where not possible,”59 in lieu of the previous, more 
lenient requirement, “to the extent that such special prosecutor 
deems appropriate.”60  
Finally, language was appended to § 594(a) permitting an 
independent counsel to “consult[] with the United States Attor-
ney for the district in which the violation was alleged to have 
occurred.”61 As observed by Terry Eastland, the objective un-
derlying the attempted integration was an overriding congres-
sional concern for prosecutorial fairness: 
Congress also tried to create a rebuttable presumption in fa-
vor of special prosecutor adherence to Department policies 
generally. . . . The legislative history indicates that the bur-
den of explaining any departure from Department policies 
should be placed on the special prosecutor. “If he does deviate 
from established practices of the Department, the special 
prosecutor should thoroughly explain his reasons for doing so 
in his report to the court at the conclusion of his investiga-
tion.” . . . Both of these amendments [to 28 U.S.C. §§ 594 (a) 
and (f)] contemplated that a special prosecutor would be less 
likely to act unfairly toward the subject of his investigation 
the more integrated he was with the institutional thinking of 
the Justice Department. Even so, the legislative history indi-
cated that Congress rejected the notion that failure of a spe-
cial prosecutor to follow Justice Department policies consti-
tuted grounds for removal. As amended, the statute provided 
 
 57. Id. § 592(c)(1). 
 58. Id. § 594(g) (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. § 594(f) (emphasis added). 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1978). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(10) (1983) (emphasis added). 
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no sanction for an unjustified departure from Department pol-
icy.62 
An attorneys’ fees provision, albeit limited, was added as 
well. The provision applied only to the subject of the investiga-
tion and permitted the awarding of attorneys’ fees upon satis-
faction of two requirements: first, that the subject was not in-
dicted; and second, that, but for the independent counsel 
investigation, the fees would not have been incurred.63 Finally, 
changes to § 596 marginally liberalized the ability of an Attor-
ney General to remove an independent counsel. The new 
amendments empowered the removal of an independent coun-
sel for “good cause” in lieu of the previous, higher standard of 
“extraordinary impropriety.”64 
C. 1987 Amendments 
Like the amendments in 1983, the 1987 amendments con-
tained many substantive revisions. Unlike the 1983 amend-
ments, however, the Reauthorization Act of 1987 was notable 
for its sheer multitude of statutory modifications.65 
Under the original enactment, the Attorney General was 
required to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of 
specific information indicating a violation of federal criminal 
law by a covered official.66 Thus, any preliminary investigation 
 
 62. EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 73-74. 
 63. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(g)(1)-(2). 
 64. Id. § 596(a)(1). Eastland explained the congressional motivation underlying 
the amendment: 
This amendment represented a bit of constitutional housekeeping. The removal 
standard of “extraordinary impropriety” applied to no other officials, not even the 
heads of independent agencies, who could be dismissed for “good cause.” It was an 
indefinable standard, yet presumably it tied the Attorney General’s hands more 
tightly than “good cause.” And it produced this irony: heads of independent agen-
cies performed duties that were in theory less executive than those performed by a 
special prosecutor, yet they could be more easily removed. Of course, Congress did 
not want special prosecutors removed once appointed; the legislative history indi-
cated, in fact, that in the view of Congress the failure to obey a presidential order 
would not constitute a “good cause” for dismissal. But this understanding did not 
diminish Congress’ desire to reduce the statute’s potential constitutional vulner-
ability. By applying to special prosecutors the same removal standard as applied to 
heads of independent agencies, Congress was hoping to insulate Title VI from con-
stitutional challenge and to provide the Attorney General and the courts a devel-
oped body of law by which to understand “good cause.” 
EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 67. 
 65. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1987) (setting five-year sunset provision). 
 66. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1978). See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Sec-
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was necessarily dependent upon an initial finding by the At-
torney General that the information received was sufficiently 
specific. In 1987, an amendment was added that circumscribed 
the scope of this initial inquiry. Specifically, § 591(d)(1) limited 
the Attorney General’s consideration to two criteria: first “the 
specificity of the information received; and [second] the credi-
bility of the source(s) of information.”67 No other issues, includ-
ing the intent of the accused, could be considered.68 Moreover, 
another amendment required the Attorney General to complete 
this inquiry within fifteen days after initial receipt of the in-
formation. If, after this time period, the Attorney General de-
termined that the information was specific and from a credible 
source, or the Attorney General was unable to make a determi-
nation within the allotted time, a preliminary investigation 
would commence.69 On the other hand, a preliminary investiga-
tion was not required if the Attorney General determined that 
the information was either nonspecific or from a noncredible 
source.70 
A concomitant measure imposed a considerable restriction 
upon an Attorney General’s consideration of an accused’s men-
tal state during the preliminary investigative phase. Under the 
new amendment, an Attorney General could decline a matter 
for independent counsel referral on this basis only if “there 
 
tion 591(a) was amended in 1987 to read as follows: 
The Attorney General shall conduct a preliminary investigation in accordance with 
section 592 whenever the Attorney General receives information sufficient to con-
stitute grounds to investigate whether any person described in subsection (b) may 
have violated any Federal criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class 
B or C misdemeanor or an infraction. 
28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1987). Whereas § 591(b) carefully delineated the individuals subject 
to the Act, § 591(c), enacted in 1987, expanded this list somewhat indefinitely. Subsec-
tion (c) authorized the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation with 
respect to individuals not delineated in subsection (b) whenever she received sufficient 
information indicating a violation of federal law, and an investigation by the Attorney 
General (or other designated Department of Justice official) posed a “personal, finan-
cial, or political conflict of interest.” Id. § 591(c). Section 591(e) was also enacted which 
required Attorney General recusal from an investigation whenever “information re-
ceived under this chapter involves the Attorney General or a person with whom the 
Attorney General has a current or recent personal or financial relationship”; in such 
instances, “the next most senior officer in the Department of Justice” (assuming the 
nonexistence of a disqualifying conflict) shall be appointed to conduct the investigation. 
Id. § 591(e). 
 67. Id. § 591(d)(1). 
 68. See id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(i); see also EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 85. 
 69. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(d)(2). 
 70. See id. 
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[was] clear and convincing evidence that the person lacked 
such state of mind.”71 Furthermore, § 592(a)(1), as amended, 
contained an additional proviso that restricted to ninety days a 
preliminary investigation conducted pursuant to a congres-
sional request.72 
There were also several amendments that addressed con-
gressional concerns pertaining to independent counsel jurisdic-
tion. An amendment to § 593(b), for example, was enacted to 
address prosecutorial inefficiency attributable to jurisdictional 
limitations on independent counsel investigative activity.73 
Specifically, subsection (b)(3) directed the division of the court, 
when defining prosecutorial jurisdiction, to 
assure that the independent counsel has adequate authority 
to fully investigate and prosecute the subject matter with re-
spect to which the Attorney General has requested the ap-
pointment of the independent counsel, and all matters related 
to that subject matter. Such jurisdiction shall also include the 
authority to investigate and prosecute Federal crimes, other 
than those classified as Class B or C misdemeanors or infrac-
tions, that may arise out of the investigation or prosecution of 
the matter with respect to which the Attorney General’s re-
quest was made, including perjury, obstruction of justice, de-
struction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.74 
Thus, in its initial grant of jurisdiction, the division of the court 
was directed to permit an independent counsel to investigate 
and prosecute those matters deemed “related” to the subject 
matter preliminarily investigated by the Attorney General. 
Therefore, an independent counsel was now empowered to in-
vestigate and prosecute certain matters without obtaining prior 
approval from the Attorney General. Related matters could in-
 
 71. Id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 592(c)(1) was also amended to read: “In deter-
mining under this chapter whether reasonable grounds exist to warrant further inves-
tigation, the Attorney General shall comply with the written or other established poli-
cies of the Department of Justice with respect to the conduct of criminal 
investigations.” Id. § 592(c)(1) (emphasis added). See supra note 56 and accompanying 
text. 
 72. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1). In contrast to information received from noncon-
gressional sources, the Attorney General was required to conduct her initial inquiry 
and her preliminary investigation within 90 days. See id; see also supra notes 16-19 
and accompanying text; EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 85. 
 73. See discussion of this provision in the context of Morrison v. Olson infra notes 
130-48 and accompanying text. 
 74. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3). 
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clude, but were not restricted to, perjury, obstruction of justice, 
destruction of evidence, and witness intimidation, among other 
federal criminal offenses. 
Whereas § 593(b) concerned “related matter” jurisdiction, 
another section, 593(c)(2), was added to address jurisdictional 
issues deemed unrelated to the original grant. Anticipating the 
situation where an independent counsel uncovered alleged 
criminal activity extraneous to the original jurisdictional man-
date, subsection (c)(2) authorized the independent counsel to 
present such information to the Attorney General for conduct-
ing a preliminary investigation.75 Though otherwise governed 
by § 592, the Attorney General, in such instances, was required 
to complete the investigation within thirty days of receipt of 
the information and to give “great weight to any recommenda-
tions of the independent counsel.”76 
Finally, an array of miscellaneous amendments were also 
enacted that addressed, inter alia, Attorney General and inde-
pendent counsel conduct, as well as the responsibilities owed to 
and by the division of the court and Congress.77 
 
 75. See id. § 593(c)(2). 
 76. Id. § 593(c)(2)(A). 
 77. See EASTLAND, supra note 52 at 86-87 (summarizing the respective amend-
ments). The following amendments represent a nonexhaustive listing of the remaining 
amendments enacted in 1987: § 592(a)(1) (requiring Attorney General to “promptly no-
tify the division of the court . . . of the commencement of [a] preliminary investigation 
and the date of such commencement”); § 592(g)(3) (requiring Attorney General to pro-
vide the congressional committee who requested an independent counsel investigation 
with any documentation that the independent counsel filed with the division of the 
court; further requiring Attorney General, if an independent counsel appointment is 
not sought, to provide a report to the congressional committee detailing the reasons 
underlying the declination); § 592(g)(4) (authorizing congressional committee to release 
for public consumption documents “as will not in the committee’s judgment prejudice 
the rights of any individual”); § 593(d) (authorizing the division of the court to request 
of the Attorney General “further explanation of the reasons” underlying her refusal, 
after a preliminary investigation, to seek the appointment of an independent counsel); 
§ 593(b)(2) (providing that the division of the court shall appoint as independent coun-
sels individuals with “appropriate experience . . . who” will conduct an efficient and 
prompt investigation); § 594(h)(1) (requiring independent counsel to file periodic ex-
pense reports and a final report detailing the investigative and prosecutorial work of 
independent counsel’s office); § 594(h)(2) (authorizing the division of the court to pub-
licly release such reports “as are appropriate to protect the rights of any individual 
named in such report and to prevent undue interference with any pending prosecu-
tion”); § 596(c) (requiring periodic Comptroller General audits of independent counsel 
expenditures and submission of a report to Congress upon conclusion of the independ-
ent counsel’s investigation). 
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D. 1994 Amendments 
Though numerous, the amendments enacted in 1994 were 
comparatively less substantive than in years past. Nonetheless, 
the 1994 amendments were notable in certain respects.78 
For example, members of Congress were explicitly added to 
the list of covered persons.79 Though theoretically encompassed 
within the statute in 1987, the 1994 amendments sought to al-
lay suggestions to the contrary by categorically subjecting 
members of Congress to independent counsel prosecution.80 In 
addition, the period of time within which the Attorney General 
was required to determine whether a preliminary hearing was 
warranted was increased from fifteen to thirty days.81 
The statute, as originally enacted, mandated Department of 
Justice assistance when requested by an independent counsel. 
In an attempt to characterize the contemplated assistance, the 
statute rather generally stated that the Department should 
provide, inter alia, the “personnel necessary to perform such 
independent counsel’s duties.”82 The 1994 amendments ex-
pounded upon this personnel issue by detailing, with somewhat 
greater precision, the type of assistance contemplated. Section 
594(d)(1) was amended by additionally providing that, upon in-
dependent counsel request, “prosecutors, administrative per-
sonnel and other employees of the Department of Justice” shall 
be detailed to the office of independent counsel.83 
Congress, yet again, tinkered with the language of § 594(f). 
Specifically, Congress deleted the quoted language which pro-
vided that an independent counsel “shall, except where not 
possible, comply” with departmental policies. The newest 
amendment now mandated compliance “except to the extent 
that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this 
chapter.”84 Appended thereto was the following additional sen-
tence: “To determine these policies and policies under subsec-
tion (l)(1)(B), the independent counsel shall, except to the ex-
tent that doing so would be inconsistent with the purposes of 
 
 78. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994) (setting five-year sunset provision until June 30, 
1999). 
 79. See id. § 591(c)(2). 
 80. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(c) (1987). 
 81. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(d)(2) (1994). 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 594(d) (1978). 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(1) (1994). 
 84. Id. § 594(f)(1). See also supra notes 34 and 59 and accompanying text. 
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this chapter, consult with the Department of Justice.”85 
There were also a number of revisions pertinent to inde-
pendent counsel expenditures. The amendments, though in-
definite and subjectively phrased, directed the independent 
counsel to “(i) conduct all activities with due regard for ex-
pense; (ii) authorize only reasonable and lawful expenditures; 
and (iii) promptly, upon taking office, assign to a specific em-
ployee the duty of certifying that expenditures of the independ-
ent counsel are reasonable.”86 
Moreover, the independent counsel was required to follow 
Department of Justice policies with respect to expenditures, 
unless compliance was “inconsistent with the purposes of this 
chapter.”87 Finally, the division of the court’s authority to ter-
minate the operations of an independent counsel was appended 
with certain periodic review requirements. Specifically, the di-
vision of the court was instructed to “determine on its own mo-
tion whether termination is appropriate under this paragraph 
no later than 2 years after the appointment of an independent 
counsel, at the end of the succeeding 2-year period, and there-
after at the end of each succeeding 1-year period.”88 
 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1). 
 86. Id. § 594(l)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). 
 87. Id. § 594(l)(1)(C). In addition, there were several other revisions pertinent to 
independent counsel expenditures. See id. § 594(l)(2) (requiring the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States courts to “provide administrative support and 
guidance” to an independent counsel); id. § 594(l)(3) (directing Administrator of Gen-
eral Services to provide office space—presumptively within a federal building—to inde-
pendent counsels); id. § 594(b)(2) (permitting payment of travel-related expenses in-
curred by independent counsel); id. § 594(b)(3)(A) (prohibiting payment of travel 
related expenses to independent counsel employees after one year of service “for the 
purpose of commuting to or from the city in which the primary office of the independent 
counsel or person is located); id. § 595(a)(2) (This section was amended to require inde-
pendent counsels to annually report to Congress regarding independent counsel activi-
ties, “including a description of the progress of any investigation or prosecution con-
ducted by the independent counsel.” Though the report could omit confidential 
information, the independent counsel was required to provide information “adequate to 
justify the expenditures that the office of the independent counsel has made.”); id. § 
596(c) (amending section to further require an independent counsel to submit twice 
annually a statement of expenditures, and the Comptroller General to conduct a finan-
cial review of the statements and to submit the results to Congress). 
 88. Id. § 596(b)(2). For a discussion of litigation challenging the constitutionality 
of this provision, see infra note 234. 
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III. 1999 LAPSING OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE 
A. Arguments Against Renewal 
The high drama and tensions associated with Independent 
Counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation of President Bill Clin-
ton, and the subsequent impeachment hearings, left Congress 
in a quagmire with respect to the future of the independent 
counsel law.89 While some expressed support for renewal with 
substantive modifications,90 others expressed deep reservations 
about the law, preferring to return the investigative function to 
the Attorney General.91 
 
 89. The statute expired on June 30, 1999. See Independent Counsels Needed; 
Abuses Shouldn’t Overshadow the Law’s Benefits, supra note 5; United States Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing on the Independent Counsel Act, 
FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 (statement of Senator Robert G. Torricelli) 
[hereinafter Torricelli Testimony], in which Senator Torricelli addressed Kenneth Starr 
by stating: 
You will forgive me, but I do not understand how a learned man of good judgment 
allowed things to get to this state of affairs. It is true that you were under a merci-
less attack. But it was not necessary to pin a target to your chest on all occasions 
either. And to be fair, you were a contributor to some of your own public demise in 
the eyes of the American people . . . . I believe there is virtually no chance the in-
dependent counsel statute will be reenacted, and indeed I believe in this last final 
chapter of this sorry episode you have done a service to the nation by participating 
in its demise. 
Id. 
 90. See United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing 
on the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 (testimony 
of Senator Lieberman) [hereinafter Lieberman Testimony]; see also U.S. Senate Com-
mittee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing on the Independent Counsel Act, FED. 
DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 (testimony of Senator Collins); Statement of 
Lawrence E. Walsh Before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
Hearing on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, 
Mar. 24, 1999; Statement of Professor Ken Gormley Before the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs on the Reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act, FED. 
DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 24, 1999; Statement of Samuel Dash Before the Committee 
on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Concerning the Reauthorization of the 
Independent Counsel Statute, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 24, 1999 [hereinafter 
Dash Testimony]; John Q. Barrett Open Session Statement Before the United States 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearing on the Future of the Independent 
Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 17, 1999. 
 91. See Statement of Kenneth Starr Before the United States Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs Hearing on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. 
CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 [hereinafter Starr Testimony]; see also Statement of 
Professor Julie R. O’Sullivan, Senate Government Affairs, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, 
Mar. 24, 1999; Statement of Janet Reno Attorney General Before the Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs United States Senate Concerning the Independent Counsel Act, FED. 
DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 17, 1999 [hereinafter Reno Testimony]; Statement of Wil-
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During the reauthorization debate, structural concerns 
formed the basis for much of the opposition. Replete and varied 
in nature, the criticism expressed left few aspects of the statute 
untainted. The foci of the structural disfavor included the stat-
ute’s low threshold for the appointment of independent coun-
sels;92 the statute’s disallowance for the selection of highly 
qualified independent counsels and for the adequate prioritiza-
tion of cases and resources;93 reporting requirements that fre-
quently subjected those who were not charged with a crime to 
severe criticism;94 the statute’s inability to adequately account 
for the scope and length of independent counsel investigations 
and expenditures;95 and Attorney General preclusion from util-
izing subpoenas, the grand jury, and grants of immunity dur-
ing preliminary investigations.96 
Above the statutory critiques, however, lay an overriding 
criticism that was recurrent throughout the debate: namely, 
that the statute failed in its primary purpose—to engender 
public confidence in, and remove politics from, the prosecution 
of Executive Branch officials. The most notable opponents to 
reauthorization, Attorney General Janet Reno and Independ-
ent Counsel Kenneth Starr, expressed their concern that the 
independent counsel law failed in its principal mission. As 
stated by Reno: 
 
 
liam P. Barr Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law Com-
mittee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives Concerning the Inde-
pendent Counsel Statute, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 10, 1999; Statement of 
Robert S. Bennett Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, FED. DOC. 
CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 3, 1999 [hereinafter Bennett Testimony]; Repealing the Inde-
pendent Counsel Act, Statement of Alcee Hastings, Committee on the Judiciary Sub-
committee on Commercial and Administrative Law, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 
2, 1999. 
 92. See Statement of Chairman Fred Thompson Hearing on the Independent 
Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 17, 1999 [hereinafter Thompson Testi-
mony]. 
 93. See Statement of Benjamin R. Civiletti Before the Subcommittee on Commer-
cial and Administrative Law Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Repre-
sentatives Concerning the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 
10, 1999. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See Statement of Philip S. Anderson on Behalf of the American Bar Associa-
tion Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives on the Subject of the In-
dependent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 10, 1999. 
 96. See Bennett Testimony, supra note 91. 
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 Whenever a high-level official is accused of wrongdoing, 
the stakes are high. Almost by definition, these are significant 
cases that generate a lot of interest—in the newspapers, up 
here on Capitol Hill, and in political circles across the coun-
try. As a consequence, just about every decision becomes con-
troversial—be it an Attorney General decision whether to 
trigger the Act and seek the appointment of an independent 
counsel, or an independent counsel’s decision to pursue a par-
ticular prosecutorial course. And I have come to believe that 
the statute puts the Attorney General in a no-win situation. 
Or, as I have said in the past: an Attorney General is criti-
cized if she triggers the statute, and criticized if she doesn’t. 
 On the other side of the equation, the decisions of an inde-
pendent counsel are no less subject to criticism and second-
guessing. . . . I’m just saying that it is natural, and that this 
climate of criticism and controversy weakens—rather than 
strengthens—the public’s confidence in the impartial exercise 
of prosecutorial power. And that, at the end of the day, under-
cuts the purpose of the Act. Instead of giving people confi-
dence in the system, the Act creates an artificial process that 
divides responsibility and fragments accountability.97 
Starr added his persepective as an independent counsel: 
[I]ndependent Counsels are vulnerable in a larger sense . . . . 
In high-profile cases, as Professor Julie O’Sullivan (ph) testi-
fied, . . . “those under investigation or their political allies 
have every incentive to impugn the integrity and impartiality 
of any statutory [independent counsel] who . . . uncovers 
wrongdoing.” For presidents who are under investigation, 
Henry Ruth . . . observed, the lesson of recent history is: 
“[A]ttack, attack, attack the lawyers, attack the witnesses, at-
tack the prosecutor, attack the laws the prosecutor seeks to 
enforce.”. . .  
 . . . [T]here are several dimensions to this attack strategy. 
First, independence can be misrepresented as antagonism. 
Second, the Department of Justice, which has incentives to 
come to the aid of a U.S. Attorney or a regulatory independent 
counsel, has no incentive to help a statutory Independent 
Counsel. With no institutional defender, independent coun-
sels are especially vulnerable to partisan attack. In this  
fashion, the legislative effort to take politics out of law  
 
 97. Reno Testimony, supra note 91. 
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enforcement sometimes has the ironic effect of further politi-
cizing it.98 
Yet, even among those who questioned the wisdom of reau-
thorization, there was a realization that the alternative, allow-
ing the law to expire, was, at best, an imperfect remedy. As 
stated by Senator Fred Thompson: 
We may conclude that, on balance, it is best to let the Inde-
pendent Counsel Law expire and allow the authority to revert 
back to the Justice Department. However, as we can see, such 
a prospect raises the question as to what to do about the con-
flict of interest and public perception problem that remains 
when an Attorney General insists on keeping in-house a mat-
ter involving the President. I would suggest it is going to re-
quire much more effort on the part of Congress both in the 
confirmation process and with regard to its oversight respon-
sibilities. And I think it is ultimately going to require more 
vigilance by the American people.99 
B. Shortcomings of the Arguments Against Renewal 
To predict whether the independent counsel statute will 
remain in its defunct state or will ultimately be revived is a 
speculative task. In this regard, former Senator Howard 
Baker’s suggestion to Congress that there be a “cooling off pe-
riod”100 prior to any definitive decision seemed particularly co-
gent to many, including members of Congress.101 Indeed, it is 
my belief that the statute should be revived with several modi-
fications.102 For to return the function of investigating and 
prosecuting Executive Branch officials to the Attorney General 
would ignore, or improperly discount, principles of conflict of 
interest and appearance of impropriety.103 
 
 98. Starr Testimony, supra note 91. 
 99. Thompson Testimony, supra note 92. 
 100. National Digest, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 25, 1999, at 2A. 
 101. See Starr Testimony, supra note 91; Starr Denounces His Job, Defends His 
Performance, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Apr. 15, 1999, at 1A. 
 102. See Cook, supra note 10, at 320-37. 
 103. See id. at 288-97. The instant article will not attempt to critique the various 
proposals and criticisms with respect to the independent counsel statute; that was the 
subject of the article I published in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. See 
Cook, supra note 10. Rather, with respect to the arguments presented in opposition to 
reauthorization, this article will restrict its analysis to the contention that the statute 
must be abandoned due to its failure to foster public confidence. 
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In fact, this is the principal shortcoming in the arguments 
advanced by Reno and Starr. Their argument that the “climate 
of criticism and controversy”104 and the vulnerability of inde-
pendent counsels to partisan attack105 undermine public confi-
dence in the prosecutorial process is of doubtless validity. Cer-
tainly, repeated allegations of partisanship and bias, especially 
in high-profile cases, could have an adverse impact upon the 
listening public.106 However, to utilize political and media at-
tentiveness as the principal gauge by which to assess the stat-
ute’s integrity and effectiveness is misplaced. 
What is ignored in the debate surrounding reauthorization 
are the rights and perspective of the individual defendant. An 
appearance of impropriety is of relevance not only to the public-
at-large, but also on an individual level. The concept’s perti-
nence to criminal cases applies irrespective of the case’s origin 
or magnitude, or whether it is celebrated or obscure.107 
People v. Zimmer108 is illustrative of this principle.109 De-
fendant Graeme Zimmer “organized and managed” a business, 
Zimmer Inc., which was located in Hamilton County in New 
York State.110 However, after the enterprise began to experi-
ence certain economic hardships, Zimmer relinquished both his 
corporate interest as well as his position in the company.111 
Thereafter, “dissatisfied stockholders” assumed control of the 
business and, inter alia, hired a Hamilton County District At-
torney to serve as its corporate counsel.112 Approximately three 
 
 104. Reno Testimony, supra note 91. 
 105. See Starr Testimony, supra note 91. 
 106. For an extended and intriguing discussion of this argument, see Julie 
O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 463, 463-79 (1996). 
 107. For an extended discussion of the applicability of conflict of interest princi-
ples to a defendant in a criminal prosecution, see Cook, supra note 10, at 288-97. 
 108. 414 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1980). 
 109. For an extended discussion of Zimmer in the context of prosecutorial conflict 
of interests, see Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop Out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating 
Police Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1357-58, 1364-65 (1998). 
 110. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d at 706. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. Though incorporated, the business operated more as a “one-man enter-
prise” than as an incorporated entity. As noted by the court: 
For a long time, by what appears to have been at least silent acquiescence of the 
other investors, no reins were placed on his managerial conduct, or, if they were, 
they were not enforced. During his regime, no stockholders’ meetings were ever 
held and when, midst a corporate financial crisis in the spring of 1977, he elected 
to surrender his corporate holdings and resign, it had been nearly 10 years since 
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months after his retention, the District Attorney, who also 
happened to be a stockholder in the company,113 sought and ob-
tained a multi-count indictment charging Zimmer with an ar-
ray of criminal offenses associated with his business prac-
tices.114 During the pertinent time period, the District Attorney, 
who also tried the case, retained his dual status as stockholder 
and corporate counsel.115 
On appeal, Zimmer presented a conflict of interest argu-
ment—namely, that the District Attorney should have been 
disqualified given his relationship with the corporation and 
that the trial court, therefore, erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss the indictment; the Court of Appeals of New York 
agreed. 116 As a prefatory rationale, the Court noted the duty 
owed by the prosecutor to both the public and the individual 
defendant: 
Central to the issue so sharply drawn is the pivotal point at 
which a public prosecutor stands in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Unlike other participants in the traditional common-law 
adversarial process, whose more singular function is to pro-
tect and advance the rights of one side, a District Attorney 
carries an additional and more sensitive burden. It is not 
enough for him to be intent on the prosecution of his case. 
Granted that his paramount obligation is to the public, he 
must never lose sight of the fact that a defendant, as an inte-
gral member of the body politic, is entitled to a full measure of 
fairness. Put another way, his mission is not so much to con-
vict as it is to achieve a just result.117 
Thus, the prosecutor, at a minimum, has dual fidelities; he is 
obligated to pursue the interests of the people as well as to en-
sure that justice is not breached. The attainment of justice, 
however, is compromised whenever a prosecutor is permitted to 
pursue a prosecution despite the presence of a conflict of inter-
est. In such an instance, it is not the pulse of the general pub-
lic, as Reno and Starr suggest, that is gauged to determine 
whether the pursuit is nonetheless worthwhile. Rather, it is 
 
the directors had met. 
Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 707 (emphasis added). 
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the perspective of the defendant that is of equal, if not para-
mount, significance. Moreover, the argument that the Depart-
ment of Justice is fully capable of investigating, and prosecut-
ing, alleged Executive Branch wrongdoing, either internally or 
via a departmental appointment of a special prosecutor, is 
similarly without force.118 No matter how noble the intentions, 
or competent the prosecutors, an appearance of impropriety ex-
ists,119 particularly from the perspective of the defendant.120 
 
 118. See Reno Testimony, supra note 91. Reno elaborated upon her contention that 
the independent counsel statute should lapse and that the investigative function 
should be returned to the Department of Justice: 
  But let me be clear, also, about what our position does not mean. It does not 
mean that allegations of high-level corruption should be pursued with anything 
less than the utmost vigor and seriousness of purpose. And it does not mean that 
the Department considers itself capable of pursuing, in the ordinary course, each 
and every allegation of corruption at the highest levels of our government. We 
know that, sometimes, a special prosecutor is in order. 
  Yet we have come to believe that the country would be best served by a re-
turn to the system that existed before the Independent Counsel Act—when the 
Justice Department took responsibility for all but the most exceptional of cases 
against high-ranking public officials, and when the Attorney General exercised the 
authority to appoint a special prosecutor in exceptional situations. . . . 
  When high-level officials have been accused of wrongdoing, the Department 
has not hesitated to fully investigate. Over the last two decades, the Department 
of Justice has obtained the convictions of 13,345 public officials and employees 
from both sides of the political aisle. 
Id. 
 119. See Dash Testimony, supra note 90. Senator Dash noted that Attorney Gen-
eral Reno, in 1993, supported reauthorization based upon an inherent conflict of inter-
est that exists whenever the Executive Branch is asked to investigate itself: 
  Then, in 1993, in a remarkable turnaround for the Justice Department, At-
torney General Reno appeared before this Committee and enthusiastically urged 
the Committee to reauthorize the legislation. She rejected prior Justice Depart-
ment claims that the department had no conflict in investigating high executive 
branch officials. Instead, she stated that the reason she supported the independent 
counsel legislation was that “there is an inherent conflict whenever senior execu-
tive branch officials are to be investigated by the department and its appointed 
head, the Attorney General.” . . . She said in 1993: 
  The Attorney General serves at the pleasure of the president. Recognition of 
this conflict does not belittle or demean the professionalism of the department’s 
career prosecutors. . . . They are not political, they are splendid lawyers . . . I still 
feel there will be a need for this legislation, based on my experience as a prosecu-
tor for 15 years in Dade County. It is absolutely essential for the public, in the pro-
cess of the criminal justice system, to have confidence in that system, and you 
cannot do that when there is a conflict or an appearance of conflict in the person 
who is, in effect, the chief prosecutor. 
Id. 
 120. See Cook, supra note 10, at 296-97 (1998) (observing, inter alia, though inter-
nal Executive Branch investigations and prosecutions will produce a perception, if not 
a reality, that the subject of those investigations will benefit from favorable treatment, 
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And, no matter how firmly and conscientiously a District At-
torney may steel himself against the intrusion of a competing 
and disqualifying interest, he never can be certain that he has 
succeeded in isolating himself from the inroads on his subcon-
scious . . . . 
. . . . 
 Assuming he intended to be as fair and objective as fair 
could be, in presenting this evidence where did his role as 
partisan corporate attorney end and where did that of non-
partisan District Attorney begin? At what point was he serv-
ing which of his two masters? To put the questions is to state 
the problem, a problem instinct with due process implications. 
 Moreover, even if the actuality or potentiality of prejudice 
were absent, what of the appearance of things? No matter the 
good faith and complete integrity of the District Attorney, un-
der these circumstances what impression could the defendant 
have had of the fairness of a prosecution instituted by one 
with the personal and financial attachments of this prosecu-
tor? Would it have been unreasonable for the defendant—or 
others—to doubt that the public officer, whose burden it was 
to screen the complaint for frivolousness and, if necessary, 
guide its destiny before the Grand Jury, would do so disinter-
estedly? 
 It was important that these responsibilities, carried out in 
the name of the State and under the color of law, be con-
ducted in a manner that fostered rather than discouraged 
public confidence in our government and the system of law to 
which it is dedicated. . . . In particular, the District Attorney, 
as guardian of this public trust, should have abstained from 
an identification, in appearance as well as in fact, with more 
than one side of the controversy.121 
The unavoidable conflict of interest inherent in internal 
Executive Branch prosecutions necessarily compromises prin-
ciples of fairness and appearances of propriety with respect to 
the investigation and prosecution of high-ranking Executive 
Branch officials. The dual loyalties owed by the Executive 
 
this may not always be the reality and at times the subject may be prosecuted not due 
to the evidence accrued during a particular investigation but rather to appease political 
opponents). 
 121. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d. at 707-08 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Branch prosecutor produces an appearance problem that ad-
versely skews the perceived fairness of such prosecutions in the 
eyes of both the individual defendant and the public at large. 
Therefore, it is essential that a prosecutorial process be in 
place that ensures, from the perspective of the defendant as 
well as the public, that high-ranking members of the Executive 
Branch are fairly and equitably investigated and prosecuted for 
alleged criminal wrongdoing.122 Indeed, both the apparent and 
actual fairness of a prosecutorial process is necessarily rooted 
in the integrity of the procedures it adopts; for if the procedures 
adopted are intrinsically just, the fairness of the process, in ap-
pearance and in fact, will transcend any adverse criticism. 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
With this in mind, I have proposed certain reforms to the 
independent counsel law which, I submit, effectively mandate 
compliance with Department of Justice regulations,123 preserve 
prosecutorial independence, promote fairness, and avoid the 
appearances of impropriety inextricably associated with statu-
tory abandonment.124 A recurrent, disquieting concern vocifer-
ously expressed during the reauthorization debate pertained to 
the exercise of independent counsel discretion with respect to 
investigative strategies. Many believed that some independent 
 
 122. See Lieberman Testimony, supra note 90. 
Twenty years ago, when Watergate was the nation’s most recent resonant political 
scandal, Congress passed the statute we’re now reviewing. Our predecessors were 
clearly motivated by the highest of ideals, to ensure that the rule of law would be 
applied scrupulously even in cases involving our nation’s most powerful leaders, 
even in cases involving the president. In my opinion, the law has worked in sup-
port of that worthy purpose more often than not. And I note that most Americans 
seem to agree; at least that’s what the polls indicate, which show that a healthy 
majority actually supports reauthorization of the statute, notwithstanding the re-
cent controversies that have surrounded it. 
Id. 
 123. The United States Attorneys’ Manual regulates the conduct of United States 
Attorneys and their Assistants with respect to certain pretrial, plea, and post-trial 
practices. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-2.400 (1997). The Manual, 
which is part of the aforementioned regulations of the Department of Justice, consists 
of an array of regulations that require reporting to, consultation with, or approval 
from, the Department of Justice prior to the pursuit by a prosecutor of a wide array of 
pretrial, plea, and post-trial strategies. See Conference, The Independent Counsel Proc-
ess: Is it Broken and How Should it Be Fixed? 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1546 
(1997) [hereinafter Conference]. 
 124. For an extended discussion of these proposed reforms, see Cook, supra note 
10, at 316-36. 
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counsels, particularly Kenneth Starr, habitually disregarded 
Department of Justice guidelines during the conduct of their 
affairs.125 Indeed, in light of the permissive language of § 594(f), 
the periodic failure of independent counsels to adhere to De-
partment of Justice regulations should have been antici-
pated.126 Though I concur with many of the aforementioned 
sentiments, I disagree that the solution lies in statutory disso-
 
 125. See Lieberman Testimony, supra note 90. 
The Department of Justice is currently considering whether Judge Starr failed to 
follow certain Department of Justice guidelines which are supposed to apply to 
every citizen. So I’d be interested in learning how much weight Judge Starr gave 
to those guidelines in his conduct as independent counsel. How he feels about the 
guidelines and whether we should find a way to better emphasize adherence to 
them and receive consultations—require consultations with the department. 
Id.; see also U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing on the In-
dependent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 (testimony of Sena-
tor Levin). Senator Levin stated: 
Looking at the record of your office, Mr. Starr, in my judgment, despite our best ef-
forts to establish reasonable limits on the power of independent counsels, you and 
your office have managed to exceed those limits. In the ABC News case, you stated 
to the court that the relevant Justice Department regulations did “[n]ot govern an 
independent counsel.” In my judgment, you’ve gone beyond what an average 
prosecutor would do in the investigation of a private citizen and you have failed to 
comply with Justice Department policies as intended under the Independent 
Counsel law. . . . So the key limits that the law intended to put on the power of in-
dependent counsels have not proven effective. And I believe that we need to de-
termine in the months ahead whether or not we can amend the statute or remedy 
that problem as I perceive it, so that the limits on power which are so important to 
the constitutionality of this statute and to its fairness can be made practically ef-
fective. 
Id.; see also Torricelli Testimony, supra note 89. Addressing Independent Counsel 
Starr, Senator Torricelli stated, “The Lewinsky matter, the Steele matter, the Willey 
matter are an example of what unchecked power does to good people. Julie Hiatt 
Steele’s daughter’s boyfriend was questioned before the grand jury about whether she 
(sic) ever had sex with Mrs. Steele. How much worse does this get?” Id. In U.S. Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing on the Independent Counsel Act, 
FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999, Senator Specter testified: 
One of the objections which was raised, and I do not know the factual basis, is that 
an immunity grant had been given without counsel being present and it was not in 
conformity with Department of Justice rules. . . . And I’m not saying you were 
wrong, but I’m trying to address their concerns, or what other independent counsel 
has done . . . . 
Id. 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1) (1994) provides: 
An independent counsel shall, except to the extent that to do so would be inconsis-
tent with the purposes of this chapter, comply with the written or other established 
policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws. 
To determine these policies . . . the independent counsel shall, except to the extent 
that doing so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter, consult with 
the Department of Justice. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also supra notes 34, 59, 84 and accompanying text. 
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lution. Rather, via amendments to the statute, independent 
counsel conduct can be effectively regulated and subjected to 
the policies of the Justice Department. 
To achieve this objective, independent counsels should be 
required to adhere to the following two-pronged procedure. 
First, whenever an independent counsel seeks to pursue a pre-
trial, plea, or post-trial strategy which is regulated by the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual, the independent counsel 
must report to, consult with, or obtain approval from a desig-
nated Department of Justice official prior to embarking upon 
the endeavor.127 If the Department of Justice approves the pro-
posed course of action, the independent counsel may then pro-
ceed. If, however, approval is not received, the independent 
counsel has a second option. This alternative, which may only 
be pursued upon satisfaction of the first prong, permits an in-
dependent counsel to present her pretrial, plea, or post-trial 
request to the division of the court. The Department of Justice 
will, of course, be permitted to present arguments in opposi-
tion. If authorization is received from the court, the independ-
ent counsel may pursue the requested conduct.128 
There are several distinct advantages to this proposal. 
First, it restrains the unbridled pursuit of questionable prose-
cutorial strategies. By mandating compliance with the United 
States Attorneys’ Manual, and thus consultation with the De-
partment of Justice, an independent counsel will be disinclined 
to pursue legal practices disfavored by the Department. In or-
 
 127. I am not suggesting that an independent counsel be subject to every regula-
tion contained within the United States Attorneys’ Manual. Instead, only those provi-
sions consistent with Morrison v. Olson should be made applicable. For a general over-
view of the United States Attorneys’ Manual, including discussion of its underlying 
purpose, see infra note 149 and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion of 
this proposal and its constitutionality, see infra notes 130-234 and accompanying text. 
 128. I have also proposed additional modifications to the statute which will, inter 
alia, more effectively regulate independent counsel conduct and improve appearances 
of propriety with respect to the selection of independent counsels and the prosecutorial 
process. For detailed descriptions of these proposals and the underlying rationales, see 
Cook, supra note 10, at 333-36 (Cook recommended that the division of the court “be 
increased from three to five judges, with two of the positions reserved for judges who 
have been appointed by presidents belonging to the incumbent’s political party. The 
remaining three positions should be filled by judges appointed by presidents from the 
opposing political party. I also propose a unanimity requirement among the [division of 
the court] judges with respect to the selection of an independent counsel”; that inde-
pendent counsels be subjected to fixed expenditure limits; and that an independent 
counsel seeking to extend his investigation be required to apply annually to the divi-
sion of the court.). 
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der to limit monetary and prosecutorial inefficiency costs, the 
proposal provides an incentive to engage in only those strategic 
ventures that will promote, rather than hinder, investigative 
efficacy. An independent counsel who surmises that a ques-
tionable legal strategy is likely to be resisted by the Depart-
ment of Justice will be disinclined to sacrifice prosecutorial ef-
ficiency in order to engage in a protracted appeal before the 
division of the court. 
The proposal also guards against Department of Justice in-
fringement upon an independent counsel investigation. The 
suggested measure disallows Attorney General initiated review 
of independent counsel activity as well as veto authority of pro-
posed prosecutorial strategies. Instead, if so pursued, the divi-
sion of the court would adjudicate any unresolved disputes be-
tween the Department of Justice and the independent counsel. 
By preserving independent counsel autonomy, the proposal 
thus carefully avoids the inherent conflict of interest and ap-
pearance pitfalls inextricably associated with a return of prose-
cutorial functions to the Attorney General. 
Finally, the proposal would entail only minimal economic 
costs. In all, only twenty independent counsel investigations 
have been commenced.129 Given such, the Justice Department 
and the division of the court would likely incur only minimal 
added economic and workload costs. This cost is further mini-
mized with respect to the division of the court. As noted, the 
division of the court has no authority under the proposal to ini-
tiate a review of independent counsel activity. Only if the inde-
pendent counsel decides to pursue division of the court review 
does the court incur the costs pursuant to this proposal. 
Aside from these benefits, however, critics of the statute 
will undoubtedly challenge the measure’s constitutionality. 
Any proposal that positively affects the duties and responsibili-
ties of the Special Division will be greeted, at a minimum, with 
great reservation. However, a review of the proposal in light of 
the Supreme Court case which upheld the constitutionality of 
the statute, Morrison v. Olson,130 will demonstrate that the 
proposal, rather than offering radical change, is a constitution-
ally sound and measured response to the public and individual 
 
 129. Of the 20 independent counsel investigations, 11 have concluded without a 
returned indictment. See Todd S. Purdum, Former Special Counsels See Need to Alter 
Law That Created Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at A1. 
 130. 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988). 
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need to ensure fairness and appearances of propriety and to 
guard against the aberrant exercise of independent counsel 
discretion. 
A. Morrison v. Olson 
The Morrison case emanated from a dispute between the 
House of Representatives and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), with respect to the latter’s limited responsive-
ness to House subpoenas requesting the production of certain 
documents.131 In 1982, the House of Representatives was inves-
tigating the enforcement by the EPA and the Land and Natural 
Resources Division of the Department of Justice of the “Super-
fund Law.”132 Pursuant to this investigation, two House sub-
committees issued subpoenas to the EPA, requesting the pro-
duction of certain documents. The EPA, acting on orders from 
President Ronald Reagan, invoked executive privilege and re-
fused to turn over the documents.133 After the EPA Administra-
tor was held in contempt, and a lawsuit was filed by the EPA 
and the United States against the House, the parties reached a 
compromise which allowed the House “limited access to the 
documents.”134 
In 1983, the House Judiciary Committee held hearings to 
ascertain the role of the Justice Department in the aforesaid 
dispute.135 Among those who testified before a House subcom-
mittee was Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General for 
 
 131. See id. at 665. See also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Morrison v. Olson: A Modest As-
sessment, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 255, 257 (1989). 
 132. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665 (explaining that the purpose underlying the 
“Superfund Law” was the cleanup of toxic waste); HARRIGER, supra note 48, at 95. 
 133. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665. It was the EPA’s contention that the docu-
ments “contained ‘enforcement sensitive information.’ ” Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Earl Dudley, Deputy to eventual Independent Counsel Alexia Morrison, de-
scribed the tense political battle which preceded their investigation: 
[O]ur investigation was focused on allegations that an earlier investigation of the 
EPA documents affair by the House Judiciary Committee—an investigation called 
for by the Speaker of the House and several House committee chairmen—had been 
obstructed by officials at the highest levels of the Reagan Justice Department. 
Particularly under Attorney General Meese, the Justice Department was the bête 
noir of Democrats in general and congressional Democrats in particular, and the 
Department had deeply offended House Members on both sides of the aisle by su-
ing the House of Representatives in the name of “the United States” in an effort to 
forestall a contempt prosecution of the Administrator of the EPA for withholding 
the disputed documents. 
Dudley, supra note 131, at 257. 
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the Office of Legal Counsel.136 Two years later, the House is-
sued a report detailing its investigation which, inter alia, inti-
mated that Olson had lied during his testimony.137 The report 
further suggested that both Edward C. Schmults, Deputy At-
torney General, and Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for the Land and Natural Resources Division, had ob-
structed the House’s investigation by illegally withholding 
requested documents.138 
Pursuant to a House request for the appointment of an in-
dependent counsel, the Public Integrity Section was requested 
by the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investiga-
tion.139 Despite the Section’s ultimate recommendation that an 
independent counsel be appointed to investigate Olson, 
Schmults, and Dinkins,140 the Attorney General disregarded 
this advice and requested “the appointment of an independent 
counsel solely with respect to Olson.”141 
James C. McKay was the original independent counsel 
named by the division of the court. However, due to a conflict of 
interest, he relinquished the post one month after his appoint-
ment, and was replaced by his chief deputy, Alexia Morrison.142 
Morrison was given jurisdiction to determine 
“whether the testimony of . . . Olson and his revision of such 
testimony on March 10, 1983, violated either 18 U.S.C. § 1505 
or § 1001, or any other provision of federal law.” The court 
also ordered that the independent counsel 
shall have jurisdiction to investigate any other allegation 
of evidence of violation of any Federal criminal law by 
Theodore Olson developed during investigations, by the 
Independent Counsel, referred to above, and connected 
 
 136. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665-66. 
 137. See id. at 666. The report was issued on December 5, 1985, and was approxi-
mately 3000 pages. See HARRIGER, supra note 48, at 96. 
 138. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Professor Harriger observes that the report 
suggested that all three should be subject to the investigation because the case ap-
peared to involve “a seamless web of events” that could not be adequately investi-
gated in isolation. It concluded that any effort to separate the allegations and indi-
viduals out would be “artificial” and “may impede the independent counsel’s ability 
to fully explore the allegations.” 
HARRIGER, supra note 48, at 96. 
 141. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666. 
 142. See id. at 667; HARRIGER, supra note 48, at 96. 
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with or arising out of that investigation, and Independent 
Counsel shall have jurisdiction to prosecute for any such 
violation. . . .143 
During the course of her investigation, however, Morrison 
sought to have the matters involving Schmults and Dinkins re-
ferred to her as “related matters.”144 The Special Division re-
fused, concluding that the Attorney General’s decision was un-
reviewable. Nonetheless, the court construed its original 
jurisdictional grant as authorizing Morrison to investigate 
whether Olson, Schmults, and Dinkins conspired to obstruct 
the congressional inquiry.145 Thereafter, Morrison issued grand 
jury subpoenas to Olson, Schmults, and Dinkins, who, in turn, 
moved to quash on the grounds that, inter alia, the independ-
ent counsel statute was unconstitutional.146 The district court 
upheld the statute’s constitutionality but was later reversed by 
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.147 In revers-
ing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court found, inter alia, that 
the authority vested in the division of the court to appoint an 
independent counsel did not violate the appointments clause; 
that Article III was not violated given that the powers assigned 
to the division of the court were either analogous to functions 
performed by the judiciary or amounted to, at most, a de mini-
mis intrusion upon the Executive Branch; and that the statute 
did not violate principles of separation of powers.148 
Unlike independent counsels, the pretrial, post-trial, and 
plea practices of United States Attorneys and Assistant United 
States Attorneys are largely regulated by the United States At-
torneys’ Manual. The purpose of the Manual is to ensure the 
impartial exercise of investigative and prosecutorial strategies 
and policies across the country by Department prosecutors. As 
stated by former United States Attorney and Whitewater Inde-
pendent Counsel Robert Fiske: 
As United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York, I was part of the Department of Justice, headed, of 
course, by the Attorney General in Washington, and there is a 
 
 143. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 667 (citation omitted). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 668. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 670-97. 
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whole system of review procedures in place that control what 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys or United States Attorneys can do in 
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. You can’t 
take certain kinds of investigative steps, like subpoenaing 
members of the media. You can’t bring certain kinds of cases, 
such as racketeering cases, without getting the approval of 
career people in the Justice Department. And the whole pur-
pose of that is so that there can be a uniform, cohesive system 
of law enforcement throughout the United States, with the 
centralized control in Washington, to make sure that some 
Assistant or some U.S. Attorney isn’t going off half-cocked in 
a way that would be detrimental to law enforcement in gen-
eral.149 
As detailed in the above statutory chronology, Congress has 
thrice constructed the language of § 594(f) in an attempt to 
mandate independent counsel compliance with Department of 
Justice policies, yet respect the independence necessary to en-
sure the actual and apparent impartial exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion.150 In the minds of many, including this author, 
the attempt to balance these objectives has, thus far, proved 
unsuccessful.151 
I submit, however, that my proposal, requiring Attorney 
General approval, with an option for review by the division of 
the court whenever certain provisions of the United States At-
torneys’ Manual are implicated, effectively addresses this ongo-
ing congressional effort to regulate independent counsel discre-
tion. By requiring Attorney General consultation, this proposal 
mandates actual compliance with Department of Justice poli-
cies and further preserves the appearance of propriety by per-
mitting the independent counsel to seek refuge in the division 
of the court from an adverse departmental determination. 
Thus, the inherent conflicts associated with Attorney General 
control over Executive Branch prosecutions are avoided, while 
prosecutorial independence is preserved. Moreover, as the fol-
lowing discussion amply illustrates, when reviewed in light of 
the Morrison case, the proposal is constitutionally sound, as 
well. 
 
 149. Conference, supra note 123, at 1546. 
 150. See supra notes 34, 59, and 84 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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B. Pretrial Practices 
1. Personal conversations 
An appropriate place to begin this critique is through a re-
view of the succession of regulations that govern prosecutorial 
behavior with respect to the interception of personal communi-
cations. For example, Department approval is required prior to 
a prosecutor applying for, or seeking an extension of, a court 
order “authorizing the interception of wire, oral and/or elec-
tronic communications”;152 prior to intercepting roving wire and 
oral communications;153 for emergency interceptions under 18 
U.S.C. § 2518(7) without a court order;154 to employ video sur-
veillance “when there is a constitutionally protected expecta-
tion of privacy requiring judicial authorization”;155 and to inter-
 
 152. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-7.110. This section 
provides: 
[T]he Electronic Surveillance Unit of the Criminal Division’s Office of Enforcement 
Operations will conduct the initial review of the necessary pleadings, which in-
clude: 
A.  The affidavit of an “investigative or law enforcement officer” of the United 
States, . . . with such affidavit setting forth the facts of the investigation that es-
tablish the basis for those probable cause (and other) statements required by Title 
III to be included in the application; 
B.  The application by any United States Attorney or his/her Assistant, . . . that 
provides the basis for the court’s jurisdiction to sign an order authorizing the re-
quested interception of wire, oral, and/or electronic communications; and 
C.  A set of orders to be signed by the court authorizing the government to inter-
cept, or approving the interception of, the wire, oral and/or electronic communica-
tions that are the subject of the application. . . . 
Id. 
 153. See id. § 9-7.111. This section reads, “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (11)(a) 
and (b), the government may obtain authorization to intercept wire, oral, and electronic 
communications of specifically named subjects without specifying with particularity 
the premises within, or the facilities over which, the communications will be inter-
cepted.” Id.  
 154. See id. § 9-7.112. This regulation states: 
Title III contains a provision which allows for the warrantless, emergency inter-
ception of wire, oral, and/or electronic communications. . . . As defined by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518 (7), an emergency situation involves either: (1) immediate danger of death 
or serious bodily injury to any person; (2) conspiratorial activities threatening the 
national security interest; or (3) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organ-
ized crime. . . . Once the AG, the DAG, or the AssocAG authorizes the law en-
forcement agency to proceed with the emergency Title III, the government then 
has forty-eight (48) hours, from the time the authorization was granted, to obtain 
a court order approving the emergency interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (7). 
Id.  
 155. Id. § 9-7.200. This section provides: 
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cept nontelephonic verbal communications when less than all 
the parties are consenting to the interception, when the inter-
ception pertains to congressional members, federal judges, and 
certain members of the Executive Branch, among others, for 
certain specified offenses.156 
Recognizing that Article III of the Constitution restricts 
federal judicial authority to “Cases” and “Controversies,”157 and 
that nonjudicial executive or administrative duties may not be 
imposed upon the judiciary,158 the majority in Morrison, none-
theless, held that the independent counsel statute did not vio-
late these limitations. In so finding, the Court initially noted 
the two-fold rationale attendant to these limitations; namely, 
“to help ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to 
prevent the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for 
the other branches.”159 Indeed, these rationales would underlie 
much of the Court’s Article III analysis. 
At various points in its opinion, the Court identified, 
grouped, and critiqued under Article III certain powers granted 
via the statute to the division of the court.160 In each instance, 
the bestowed responsibilities withstood constitutional scrutiny. 
Of particular note was the Court’s review of those delegated 
powers that “do require the court to exercise some judgment 
 
[C]ertain officials of the Criminal Division have been delegated authority to review 
requests to use video surveillance for law enforcement purposes when there is a 
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy requiring judicial authoriza-
tion. . . . When court authorization for video surveillance is deemed necessary, it 
should be obtained by way of an application and order predicated on Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 41(b) and the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651). 
Id. 
 156. See id. § 9-7.302. 
 157. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 158. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988). 
 159. Id. at 678. 
 160. The Court detailed the following duties: 
These duties include granting extensions for the Attorney General’s preliminary 
investigation; receiving the report of the Attorney General at the conclusion of his 
preliminary investigation; referring matters to the counsel upon request; receiving 
reports from the counsel regarding expenses incurred; receiving a report from the 
Attorney General following the removal of an independent counsel; granting attor-
ney’s fees upon request to individuals who were investigated but not indicted by an 
independent counsel; receiving a final report from the counsel; deciding whether to 
release the counsel’s final report to Congress or the public and determining 
whether any protective orders should be issued; and terminating an independent 
counsel when his or her task is completed. 
Id. at 680 (citations omitted). 
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and discretion.”161 Characterizing the duties assigned as “di-
rectly analogous to functions that federal judges perform in 
other contexts,” the Court expounded upon this claim by pro-
viding several concrete examples of its logic.162 Among the com-
parisons drawn was the authority of the federal courts to re-
view applications for wiretaps, which the Supreme Court 
observed “may require a court to consider the nature and scope 
of criminal investigations on the basis of evidence or affidavits 
submitted in an ex parte proceeding.”163 
Title 18, United States Code § 2516, the federal statute 
which authorizes this judicial approval and oversight authority 
with respect to communicative interceptions, provides, in per-
tinent part: 
(1) The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General [among 
several other Department of Justice officials], may authorize 
an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction 
for, and such judge may grant in conformity with § 2518 of 
this chapter an order authorizing or approving the intercep-
tion of wire or oral communications . . . .164 
Section 2518 further expounds upon this judicial authority: 
(5) No order entered under this section may authorize or ap-
prove the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic commu-
nication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the 
objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than 
thirty days. . . . Extensions of an order may be granted, but 
only upon application for an extension . . . and the court mak-
ing the findings required by subsection (3) of this section. The 
period of extension shall be no longer than the authorizing 
judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it 
was granted and in no event for longer than thirty days.165 
Hence, pursuant to these statutes, a federal judge may, in-
ter alia, authorize, extend, and terminate the government’s 
utilization of electronic eavesdropping. Indeed, privacy con-
cerns underlie this judicial role. It is well recognized that gov-
ernmental interception of personal conversations can implicate 
 
 161. Id. at 681. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 681-82 n.20. 
 164. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1999) (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. § 2518(5) (emphasis added). 
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an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights.166 Given 
such, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to screen governmental 
activity that potentially infringes constitutional protections. 
Thus, through the review of government wiretap and other re-
lated applications, the courts can assess the merits underlying 
such governmental requests and necessarily preempt undue 
governmental interference with individual constitutional liber-
ties. Moreover, by monitoring previously approved governmen-
tal interceptions, the courts necessarily guard against subse-
quent infringements of Fourth Amendment rights. 
Sections 9-7.110, 9-7.111, 9-7.112, 9-7.200, and 9-7.302 of 
the United States Attorneys’ Manual fall squarely within this 
province of judicial activity. All pertain to the interception of 
verbal communications or visual conduct, and, with the excep-
tion of section 9-7.302, expressly reference the authority of the 
federal courts with respect to such matters.167 Moreover, all, ei-
ther potentially or in fact, implicate Fourth Amendment inter-
ests. The division of the court, upon independent counsel re-
quest, would simply be required, under my proposal, to review 
and render a decision with respect to the propriety of proposed 
governmental interceptions of verbal and visual communica-
tions. Nothing more is required. Hence, the contemplated judi-
cial functions are perfectly congruous with the judicial review 
authority cited with approval in Morrison. 
2. Grand jury 
As with wiretaps, a Department prosecutor’s grand jury-
related activity is similarly subject to a vast array of regula-
tions. For example, before a grand jury subpoena can be served 
upon a target of an investigation, the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual mandates that prior approval be obtained from either 
 
 166. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 167. See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1993) (reviewing propri-
ety of government’s application to the district court for an order authorizing a warrant 
to engage in roving electronic surveillance); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536 
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that government’s application with the district court for an or-
der authorizing the use of video surveillance was proper); United States v. Bailin, No. 
89 CR 668, 1990 WL 16437 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 1990) (holding that government was not 
required to seek judicial approval prior to engaging in the interception of oral commu-
nications where communication at issue did not implicate a Fourth Amendment inter-
est); United States v. Crouch, 666 F. Supp. 1414 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that no 
emergency existed which justified interception of telephone conversations absent judi-
cial approval). 
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the United States Attorney or the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral.168 Similarly, approval must also precede the resubpoena-
ing of a contumacious witness before successive grand juries, as 
well as the pursuit of civil contempt sanctions against the wit-
ness,169 the requesting of judicial permission to release grand 
jury materials to state and local law enforcement officials,170 
and the impaneling of a special grand jury pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3331(a).171 
Finally, there are a series of regulations pertinent to the 
initiation of grand jury reports. For instance, section 9-11.330 
requires that notification be provided when a § 3331(a) “special 
grand jury will be considering the issuance of a report” or will 
be preparing a report which was not requested by the United 
States Attorney.172 Likewise, approval must be obtained before 
a draft special grand jury report may be submitted to a § 
3331(a) special grand jury,173 and consultation is required be-
fore any regular or special grand jury report may be initi-
ated.174 
In its Article III analysis, the Supreme Court further 
analogized the judicial function under the statute to the judi-
cial role with respect to the grand jury. The Court observed 
that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), the 
 
 168. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-11.150. This 
section reads, in part: 
However, in the context of particular cases such a subpoena may carry the ap-
pearance of unfairness. Because the potential for misunderstanding is great, be-
fore a known “target” (citation omitted) is subpoenaed to testify before the grand 
jury about his or her involvement in the crime under investigation, an effort 
should be made to secure the target’s voluntary appearance. If a voluntary ap-
pearance cannot be obtained, the target should be subpoenaed only after the grand 
jury and the United States Attorney or the responsible Assistant Attorney General 
have approved the subpoena. 
Id. 
 169. See id. § 9-11.160. This regulation provides, in pertinent part: 
Prior authorization must be obtained from the Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-
nal Division, to resubpoena a witness before the successive grand jury as well as to 
seek civil contempt sanctions should the witness persist in his or her refusal to 
testify. To obtain approval, the prosecutor must show either : (a) that the witness 
is prepared to testify; or (b) that the appearance of the witness is justified since the 
witness possesses information essential to the investigation. 
Id. 
 170. See id. § 9-11.260. 
 171. See id. § 9-11.300. 
 172. Id. § 9-11.330. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. § 9-11.101. 
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federal judiciary was empowered to determine whether grand 
jury matters could be disclosed and whether a grand jury in-
vestigation could be extended.175 It was also noted that the 
courts “have traditionally supervised grand juries and assisted 
in their ‘investigative function’ by, if necessary, compelling the 
testimony of witnesses.”176 
Each of the cited provisions of the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual directly corresponds to these judicial grand jury activi-
ties. As noted, the federal judiciary is charged with manifold 
duties with respect to the grand jury, including compelling tes-
timonial evidence. Thus, whenever a witness challenges the 
service or issuance of a subpoena, it is the judiciary that must 
adjudicate the dispute.177 Indeed, it was this type of dispute—a 
subpoena challenge—that inspired Morrison v. Olson.178 
The conduct contemplated in sections 9-11.150 (targets) and 
9-11.160 (contumacious witnesses) is plainly analogous to this 
judicial function. Each is concerned with the service and issu-
ance of grand jury subpoenas to classified individuals, each ne-
cessitates judicial resolution in the event of a dispute, and each 
explicitly acknowledges the inextricable judicial role associated 
with such endeavors.179 Section 9-11.150, for example, cites to 
 
 175. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988). 
 176. Id. at 681 n.20 (citing Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959) (“A 
grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains an ap-
pendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative function without the court’s 
aid, because powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses. It is the court’s proc-
ess which summons the witness to attend and give testimony, and it is the court which 
must compel a witness to testify if, after appearing, he refuses to do so.”)). 
 177. See United States v. Doe, 541 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to quash 
subpoena requiring witness to appear before grand jury on account of alleged animosity 
between the prosecutor and the witness); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Served Upon PHE, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Ky. 1992) (rejecting claim that grand 
jury subpoena should be quashed on grounds that it was overly broad, unreasonable 
and irrelevant to the grand jury’s investigation); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 557 F. 
Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding that grand jury subpoena should not be suppressed 
on account of either attorney-client or work-product privileges); In re 1979 Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 59 (M.D. La. 1979) (holding that subpoena should not be 
quashed on jurisdictional grounds; quashing subpoena duces tecum due to vagueness 
and possible overly broad scope). 
 178. See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. Section 9-11.160 also makes 
reference to Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 n.8 (1963), which recognizes 
the authority of a court to compel a contumacious witness to comply with grand jury 
subpoena through its civil and criminal contempt powers. Section 9-11.160’s require-
ment that departmental approval be obtained prior to the seeking of contempt sanc-
tions is analogous to this judicial contempt authority. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-11.160.  
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several cases that address challenges to the issuance of grand 
jury subpoenas to investigative targets. One such case is 
United States v. Wong.180 At issue was Wong’s claim that the 
government violated her Fifth Amendment due process rights 
when it failed to inform her that she had a right to remain si-
lent when she, as a target of a criminal investigation, appeared 
before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena.181 Finding no 
abridgement of Wong’s Fifth Amendment rights, the Court ob-
served, inter alia, that the Fifth Amendment did not protect 
perjury and that there was no “unfairness” in summoning po-
tential defendants to testify before the grand jury.182 
The release of federal grand jury materials to state or local 
authorities183 also has a judicial analogue, which is found in 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(iv). That rule, 
which requires judicial approval prior to the release of such in-
formation, provides, in pertinent part: 
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters oc-
curring before the grand jury may also be made— 
 . . . . 
 (iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney 
for the government, upon a showing that such matters may 
disclose a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate of-
ficial of a state or subdivision of a state for the purpose of en-
forcing such law. 
 If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the 
grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at 
such time, and under such conditions as the court may di-
rect.184 
Thus, the rule’s plain language contemplates an inseparable 
association between a prosecutorial request to release such in-
formation and a judicial assessment of that request. Moreover, 
the rule further empowers the court to establish the terms pur-
 
 180. 431 U.S. 174 (1977). 
 181. See id. at 175. Wong was later indicted for rendering perjurious testimony 
before the grand jury. See id. at 176. 
 182. See id. at 179. 
 183. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-11.260 (requir-
ing Department of Justice approval prior to seeking judicial authority to share grand 
jury information with state or local authorities). 
 184. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iv) (emphasis added). 
COOK-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:26 AM 
1367] THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE 1407 
suant to which the information may be disseminated. 
The remaining provisions cited with respect to grand jury 
activity are similarly consonant with recognized judicial activ-
ity. Sections 9-11.300, 9-11.330, and 9-11.101, which pertain to 
the impaneling of special grand juries and the preparation of 
grand jury reports, conform to the judicial grand jury oversight 
function cited approvingly in Morrison. Title 18, United States 
Code § 3331, which is cited directly or is referenced by each of 
the aforementioned provisions, authorizes federal courts to im-
panel and extend the service of special grand juries. 
(a) In addition to such other grand juries as shall be called 
from time to time, each district court which is located in a ju-
dicial district containing more than four million inhabitants 
or in which the Attorney General [or other Department of 
Justice officials] certifies in writing to the chief judge of the 
district that in his judgment a special grand jury is necessary 
because of criminal activity in the district shall order a spe-
cial grand jury to be summoned at least once in each period of 
eighteen months unless another special grand jury is then 
serving. . . . If, at the end of such term or any extension 
thereof, the district court determines the business of the 
grand jury has not been completed, the court may enter an 
order extending such term for an additional period of six 
months.185 
Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3333 authorizes the federal judiciary to 
“examine” and “accept” reports submitted by a special grand 
jury.186 
The above authority and application plainly evinces the 
parallelism that exists between current judicial grand jury ac-
tivities and the judicial conduct proffered pursuant to my pro-
posal. Every cited grand jury regulation has an irrefutable 
counterpart in an existing judicial function. Given such, the di-
vision of the court would, if requested, engage in judicial review 
activity with unambiguous analogues to judicial grand jury 
functions. 
3. Search warrants 
Prosecutorial discretion with respect to the utilization of 
search warrants is, similarly, subject to the regulations prom-
 
 185. 18 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (Supp. I 1977). 
 186. Id. § 3333(b). 
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ulgated in the Manual. For example, a prosecutor must secure 
Department of Justice approval before applying for a warrant 
to search an attorney’s office,187 as well as for any of the follow-
ing tangible items: documentary materials in the possession of 
third party “physician[s], lawyer[s], or clergym[en]”;188 work 
product materials or other documents belonging to individuals 
“reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the 
public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of 
public communication[s]”;189 and evidence of certain criminal 
tax offenses.190 
It is axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment affords protec-
tion to the individual “to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” 
and that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”191 As a general matter, this Fourth Amendment right is 
preserved by an independent judicial official who is empowered 
to issue the warrants to search.192 In determining whether a 
warrant will issue, the judicial officer will review affidavits, in 
addition to any supporting testimonial evidence that may be 
required.193 
The searches described in sections 9-13.420, 9-19.220, 9-
19.240, and 9-19.600 fall precisely within these confines: all 
implicate Fourth Amendment interests; all require the submis-
sion of a search warrant application to a judicial officer; and all 
necessitate a judicial finding of probable cause prior to execu-
tion.194 Notably, when equating judicial duties under the stat-
ute with preexisting judicial functions, the majority in Morri-
 
 187. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-13.420. 
 188. Id. § 9-19.220. 
 189. Id. § 9-19.240. 
 190. See id. § 9-19.600. 
 191. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 192. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). 
 193. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (c)(1). 
 194. See Klitzman v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1984) (granting preliminary in-
junction with respect to search warrant which led to the seizure of documentary mate-
rials in the possession of a disinterested third person); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. 
Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 1998) (finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of a 
warrant to search an attorney’s office); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Se-
cret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that Secret Service’s seizure of 
work product materials pursuant to a search warrant violated the Privacy Act of 1980). 
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son cited approvingly to the authority of the federal courts to 
issue search warrants. As with applications to engage in elec-
tronic interception, the Court observed that the review of 
search warrants “may require a court to consider the nature 
and scope of criminal investigations on the basis of evidence or 
affidavits submitted in an ex parte proceeding.”195 
The judicial duties contemplated pursuant to my proposal 
require nothing different. Upon request of an independent 
counsel, the division of the court would be required to consider 
the nature and scope of a criminal investigation, as well as the 
evidence submitted in support of the alleged need for the war-
rant. Such conduct is perfectly consonant with their preexisting 
judicial function. 
4. Trial subpoenas 
The federal judiciary performs a similar function with re-
spect to trial subpoenas. As with grand jury subpoenas, the ju-
diciary must adjudge disputes that arise pursuant to chal-
lenges to trial subpoenas. In performing this function, the court 
must consider the content of the trial subpoena, as well as the 
facts accompanying its issuance.196 United States v. Crosland is 
illustrative.197 
The case stemmed from a government search, conducted on 
October 2, 1992, of a residence leased by Maldonado Crosland 
which resulted in the seizure of, inter alia, approximately 50 
grams of cocaine base, $228,174 in United States currency, and 
other drug-related paraphernalia.198 On October 22, 1992, a 
search incident to Crosland’s arrest resulted in the recovery of 
an additional $29,301 in United States currency, as well as the 
seizure of Crosland’s automobile, a 1992 Nissan 300ZX.199 In an 
effort to contest the forfeiture of his automobile, Crosland filed, 
 
 195. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 n.20 (1988). 
 196. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon PHE, Inc., 790 F. 
Supp. 1310 (W.D. Ky. 1992) (rejecting claim that subpoena seeking certain business 
records and documents was both overbroad and irrelevant); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 557 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (denying motions to quash on the asserted 
grounds that the subpoenas violated attorney-client and work-product privileges); In re 
1979 Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 59 (M.D. La. 1979) (rejecting argument that 
grand jury subpoena should be quashed on jurisdictional grounds and granting motion 
to quash subpoena duces tecum on account of vagueness). 
 197. See United States v. Crosland, 821 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
 198. See id. at 1125. 
 199. See id. 
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on February 2, 1993, an affidavit with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration which declared that his current financial assets 
consisted of $60 in cash and that he had only earned $20,000 to 
$30,000 during the preceding twelve-month period.200 On Feb-
ruary 23, 1993, the day after having learned of the affidavit, 
the government served a grand jury subpoena duces tecum on 
the law firm that was representing Crosland—Joseph, 
Greenwald & Laake, P.A.201 The subpoena sought the produc-
tion of “[a]ny and all documents and records concerning the 
payment of any moneys by, or on behalf of, Maldonada Cro-
sland during the period September 1, 1992, to the present, in-
cluding, but not limited to, receipts, fee records, bank deposits 
and monetary instruments.”202 Before the firm had adequate 
opportunity to respond, however, a seven-count indictment was 
returned against Crosland, charging him with various narcotic-
related offenses.203 
After a judicial hearing on a motion to quash, but prior to 
the issuance of the court’s ruling, the government served upon 
the law firm a trial subpoena duces tecum, seeking the same 
information contained in the grand jury request.204 Again, the 
law firm moved to quash. 205 In granting the motion, the court 
observed that, unlike a grand jury subpoena, a trial subpoena 
must satisfy three criteria—relevancy, admissibility, and speci-
ficity—and that the subject subpoena lacked sufficient specific-
ity.206 
The specificity requirement announced in [United States v. 
Nixon] is designed to ensure that the use of trial subpoenas is 
limited to securing the presence at trial of particular docu-
ments or sharply defined categories of documents. . . . The 
fact that the government does not know who paid Crosland’s 
attorney’s fees, and is seeking to determine this information 
by means of a subpoena, points persuasively to the conclusion 
that this trial subpoena is an impermissible “fishing expedi-
tion,” not a proper request for production of specifically identi-
fied documents. . . . Because there is no way to determine 
 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. at 1126. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. at 1128. 
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whether the requested documents would in fact produce evi-
dence related to the pending charges, the trial subpoena in 
question must be quashed as insufficiently specific.207 
Discussion of this case is apt not only for its demonstrative 
value with respect to judicial involvement in subpoena dis-
putes, but also for its interrelation with the United States At-
torneys’ Manual. Section 9-13.410—Guidelines for Issuing 
Grand Jury or Trial Subpoenas to Attorneys for Information 
Relating to the Representation of Clients—mandates that an 
attorney seeking such information via a trial subpoena first  
obtain departmental consent.208 In light of the information 
sought, the government prosecutor in Crosland undoubtedly 
was required to comply with this provision prior to the sub-
poena’s issuance. In fact, the regulation expressly provides that 
the Department greatly scrutinizes such requests, given “the 
potential effects upon an attorney-client relationship that may 
result from the issuance” of such trial subpoenas.209 
To require the division of the court, upon independent 
counsel request, to review the propriety of issuing a trial sub-
poena pursuant to section 9-13.410 is directly analogous to this 
preexisting judicial function. As in Crosland, the division of the 
court would review the subpoena, as well as the facts accompa-
nying the request, before making a determination whether the 
subpoena should issue. 
The same rationale applies equally to other regulations in 
the Manual pertinent to the issuance of subpoenas. Depart-
mental approval is required, for example, before a subpoena 
may issue to a member of the news media, or before toll records 
may be obtained from such members.210 Similarly, the Depart-
ment must consent to the issuance of “any subpoenas to per-
sons or entities in the United States for records located 
abroad,” and to the service of “a subpoena ad testificandum on 
an officer of, or attorney for, a foreign bank or corporation who 
is temporarily in or passing through the United States when 
the testimony sought relates to the officer’s or attorney’s duties 
in connection with the operation of the bank or corporation.”211 
 
 207. Id. at 1129. 
 208. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-13.410. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. § 9-13.400. 
 211. Id. § 9-13.525. 
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C. Post-trial Practices 
Though the aforementioned sections represent only a sam-
pling of the multitude of pretrial regulations that govern 
United States Attorney conduct,212 there are, in addition, a host 
of regulations that govern a prosecutor’s post-trial practices. 
1. Plea procedures 
Illustrative of such regulations are those pertaining to plea 
agreements. The Manual mandates, for example, that the As-
sistant Attorney General, Criminal Division be notified when 
entering into a plea arrangement in a death penalty case.213 
Approval is also requisite for pleas of nolo contendere,214Alford 
pleas,215 multi-district (global) pleas,216 and pleas with congres-
sional members or federal judges.217 Moreover, as a general 
practice, before entering into any type of plea agreement, the 
prosecutor must consult with the investigating agency, as well 
as any victims.218 Relatedly, approval must also be secured 
prior to dismissing readily provable charges, as well as before 
filing downward departure motions.219 
 
 212. The following listing denotes some of the additional pretrial regulations that 
satisfy the constitutional mandates of Morrison: United States Attorneys’ Manual sec-
tion 9-2.181 (requiring that approval be obtained in Organized Crime Strike Force 
matters for various activities, including court authorized electronic surveillance, wit-
ness immunities, and plea agreements); section 9-5.150 (requiring approval prior to 
seeking the closure of judicial proceedings); section 9-23.130 (requiring authorization 
prior to requesting immunity); section 9-23.400 (requiring approval before initiating or 
recommending that an immunized person be prosecuted for an offense emanating from 
evidence obtained pursuant to an immunity grant); Criminal Resource Manual section 
2084 (requiring prior approval to seek a restraining order in a RICO case); United 
States Attorneys’ Manual section 9-112.110 (requiring Department authorization prior 
to seeking “the judicial forfeiture of property that would not otherwise be forfeited ad-
ministratively in cases that are not covered by the exception for compelling prosecuto-
rial considerations or the exception for aggregation of seized property”); section 9-
112.220 (requiring prior approval for “denial by seizing agency of in forma pauperis 
petition”); section 9-112.240 (requiring approval before a “pre-indictment ex parte ap-
plication [may be submitted] for a Temporary Restraining Order in a criminal forfei-
ture case”). 
 213. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-10.100. 
 214. See id. § 9-16.010. 
 215. See id. § 9-16.015. 
 216. See id. § 9-27.641. 
 217. See id. § 9-16.110. 
 218. See id. § 9-16.030. Consultation is also required before agreeing to return 
property otherwise subject to forfeiture. See id. § 9-113.103. 
 219. See id. § 9-16.030. 
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The judicial role with respect to the acceptance of pleas is 
well established. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure explicitly provides that it is the duty of the court to ac-
cept or reject a proposed guilty plea as well as any dispositive 
arrangements subsequently entered into between the govern-
ment and the defendant. The pertinent aspects of Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11 provide: 
(a) Alternatives 
 (1) In General. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or 
nolo contendere. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defen-
dant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of 
not guilty. 
 (2) Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and 
the consent of the government, a defendant may enter a con-
ditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . . 
(b) Nolo Contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere 
only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be ac-
cepted by the court only after due consideration of the views 
of the parties and the interest of the public in the effective 
administration of justice. 
. . . . 
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure. 
. . . . 
 (2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been 
reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require 
the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing 
of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered.220 
Rule 11 also requires judicial approval prior to the dismissal of 
criminal charges.221 The court must further inform the defen-
 
 220. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (a)(1) and (2), (b), and (e)(2). See also North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that the trial court did not err when, in possible 
death penalty case, the court accepted a plea of guilty where the state had strong evi-
dence of his guilt and the defendant maintained his innocence); United States v. 
Rivera, 25 F. Supp. 2d 167, 168 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing that Rivera’s codefen-
dants had earlier entered into a global plea agreement with the government). 
 221. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e)(1)(A). 
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dant that, in imposing sentence, it must follow the Sentencing 
Guidelines, if applicable, but that it may depart (upward or 
downward) from that sentencing range.222 
Given this judicial role, it can scarcely be claimed that divi-
sion of the court authority, as defined in my proposal, to en-
dorse such plea and sentencing arrangements constitutes ei-
ther an impermissible burden on Executive Branch authority 
or is inconsistent with the division of the court’s existing judi-
cial functions. Rather, such a function is consonant with long-
standing judicial practice. 
2. Appellate procedures 
Similarly, there are several regulations that address a 
prosecutor’s appellate practices. Section 9-2.170 provides, in 
pertinent part, that approval must be obtained for: 
2. A petition for rehearing that suggests rehearing en banc—
and any rare appeal in which the government wishes to sug-
gest that it be heard initially en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 
35(c). Although a petition for panel rehearing does not require 
the approval of the Solicitor General, one should not be filed 
until the Solicitor General has been given the opportunity to 
decide whether the case merits en banc review. 
3. A petition for mandamus or other extraordinary relief. 
4. In a government appeal, a request that the case be as-
signed to a different district court judge on remand. 
5. A request for recusal of a court of appeals judge. 
6. A petition for certiorari [which may be filed only by the So-
licitor General] . . . .223 
Each of the delineated categories pertain to prosecutorial 
appellate processes that directly correspond to routine United 
States circuit court or Supreme Court practice. Federal appel-
late courts routinely decide whether petitions for rehearings or 
en banc reviews are granted,224 whether mandamus relief is 
 
 222. See id. at 11(c)(1). 
 223. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-2.170. 
 224. See FED. R. APP. P. 40 (detailing procedures with respect to petitions for 
panel rehearing); id. 35 (detailing procedures with respect to en banc determinations). 
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warranted,225 whether a remand order will require the assign-
ment of a different district court judge,226 and whether a circuit 
court judge should be recused from consideration of a matter.227 
Likewise, the Supreme Court customarily determines whether 
to grant petitions for certiorari.228 
To argue that the extension of such activities to the division 
of the court somehow unconstitutionally encroaches upon the 
Executive Branch function is simply an untenable notion. 
Rather than abridge Article III principles, the requirement of 
division of the court approval, if sought by the independent 
counsel, is consistent with the constitutional explication in 
Morrison. Each of the assigned duties satisfies the constitu-
tional standard given their unmistakable relation to judicial 
appellate court practice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted, inter alia, to establish that the 
exercise of independent counsel discretion can be effectively 
governed through a process that mandates compliance with the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual, satisfies the constitutional 
standards delineated in Morrison, and avoids the real and ap-
parent conflicts of interests associated with internal Executive 
Branch investigations and prosecutions. By demonstrating the 
inextricable link between the highlighted provisions of the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual and the judicial function, it 
has been demonstrated that the proposed measure is consistent 
with the requirements of Article III. 
However, there is a supplementary argument that must be 
similarly presented and equally stressed. For this, too, consti-
tutes yet another compelling Article III-based justification on 
behalf of the proposal’s constitutionality. Among the delegated 
powers considered in Morrison was the authority of the Special 
 
 225. See In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that independent 
counsel was entitled to mandamus relief). 
 226. See United States v. Waskom, 179 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that de-
fendant was entitled to the recusal of sentencing judge and to be resentenced before a 
different district court judge). 
 227. See In re Apex Oil Co., 981 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that recusal was 
not required of Eighth Circuit judge despite his former partnership in law firm that 
had represented Alaska fishermen). 
 228. See SUP. CT. R. 14 (detailing procedures with respect to petitions for writs of 
certiorari). 
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Division, as defined in § 596(b)(2), to terminate the operations 
of an independent counsel. As observed by the Supreme Court, 
that section authorized the division of the court, 
acting either on its own or on the suggestion of the Attorney 
General, [to] terminate the office of an independent counsel at 
any time if it finds that “the investigation of all matters 
within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent 
counsel . . . have been completed or so substantially completed 
that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to 
complete such investigations and prosecutions.”229 
The Court was unmistakably more troubled with this provi-
sion than with the others it had considered. It noted that the 
division’s termination authority, “especially when exercised by 
the division on its own motion, [was] ‘administrative’ ” in na-
ture, in that the division was mandated to monitor independ-
ent counsel activity and determine whether his job was “com-
pleted.”230 The Court further observed that, unlike other 
provisions the Court had considered, § 596(b) was void of ana-
logues with respect to judicial activity.231 Despite these dual 
concerns, however, the Court upheld the section, finding that it 
did not constitute a “significant judicial encroachment upon ex-
ecutive power or upon the prosecutorial discretion of the inde-
pendent counsel.”232 Construing the provision narrowly, the 
Court permitted the division of the court to terminate an inde-
pendent counsel’s activities only after determining that the 
counsel’s duties are 
truly “completed” or “so substantially completed” that there 
remains no need for any continuing action by the independent 
counsel. It is basically a device for removing from the public 
payroll an independent counsel who has served his or her 
purpose, but is unwilling to acknowledge the fact. So con-
strued, the Special Division’s power to terminate does not 
pose a sufficient threat of judicial intrusion into matters that 
are more properly within the Executive’s authority to require 
that the Act be invalidated as inconsistent with Article III.233 
 
 229. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 664 (1988) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) 
(1978)). 
 230. Id. at 682 (emphasis added). 
 231. See id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 683. 
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The concerns that occupied the Court with respect to § 
596(b)(2)—the administrative nature of the function and the 
want of analogous judicial duties—are simply not present with 
respect to the instant proposal. First, unlike § 596(b)(2), my 
proposal does not require, or even permit, any monitoring by 
the division of the court of independent counsel activity. Sec-
ond, the division is void of any authority to initiate any kind of 
review of contemplated independent counsel action. Only if the 
Department of Justice disapproves conduct proposed by an in-
dependent counsel does the independent counsel have the op-
tion to seek review before the division of the court. Division of 
the court review is entirely dependent upon the initiation of the 
process by the independent counsel. Moreover, as demon-
strated above, when review is sought, it may only be sought 
with respect to those provisions in the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual which are either directly analogous to functions per-
formed by the judiciary or impose only a de minimis judicial 
imposition upon Executive Branch activity. Thus, the two as-
pects attendant to § 596(b)(2) which proved troubling to the 
Court are completely absent here.234 
My proposal to control the exercise of independent counsel 
discretion is, I submit, constitutionally sound and imposes few, 
if any, meaningful efficiency costs. The benefits to the public at 
large as well as the oft-ignored individual defendant are ines-
timable. The reality and the appearances of fairness will be 
greatly enhanced, and with the mandated controls imposed 
upon independent counsel behavior, independent counsel con-
duct will be more managed and subject to less legitimate criti-
cism. Senator Howard Baker’s suggestion for a “cooling off” pe-
riod was, in essence, a request to avoid the incautious decision-
making that can too easily accompany an emotionally charged 
debate. Hopefully, as the period of recuperation progresses, 
Congress will recognize that not only is reauthorization neces-
sary, but that the exercise of independent counsel discretion 
can be effectively, and constitutionally, controlled. 
 
 234. See United States v. McDougal, 906 F. Supp. 494, 497 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (The 
court upheld the constitutionality of the amendments in 1994 to § 596(b)(2). For a dis-
cussion of the amendment to § 596(b)(2), see supra note 87 and accompanying text. The 
1994 amendment added certain review requirements upon the division of the court 
that, in essence, required the court, again on its own motion, to periodically determine 
whether termination of independent counsel activities was warranted. The court in 
McDougal rejected the defendant’s claim that the imposition of this extra duty upon 
the judiciary violated the dictates of Morrison.). 
